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Past and Present*

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Contributors To This Issue

GEORGE F. KENNAN, former Ambassador to the Soviet Union, is Professor in the School of Historical Studies, The Institute for Advanced Study, Princeton, New Jersey, and author of *Russia Leaves the War*, 1956.

ALVIN J. COTTRELL, Instructor of Political Science and Research Fellow, Foreign Policy Research Institute, University of Pennsylvania, is co-editor with James E. Dougherty and Robert Strausz-Hupé, of *American-Asian Tensions*, 1956, and member of the Editorial Staff of *Orbis*.

JAMES E. DOUGHERTY, Assistant Professor of Political Science, St. Joseph's College, Philadelphia, is Research Fellow, Foreign Policy Research Institute, and member of the Editorial Staff of *Orbis*.

GEORGE C. GUINS, formerly Lecturer in Political Science and Russian at the Institute of Slavic Studies, University of California, Berkeley, is the author of several books in the field of law, government, and sociology, of which the latest is *Communism On the Decline*, 1958.

SERGE ZENKOVSKY has written extensively on the Russian Church Schism and national minority groups within the U.S.S.R., and is Research Fellow at the Russian Research Center, Harvard University.

MARK WEINBAUM is Editor of the New York Russian-language daily, *Novoye Russkoye Slovo* and author of books in Russian of which the latest is a collection of essays on different themes, 1956.

RICHARD PIPES of The Russian Research Center, Harvard University, is the author of *The Formation of the Soviet Union*, 1954.

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THE RUSSIAN REVIEW

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William Henry Chamberlin
Michael Karpovich

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The purpose of *The Russian Review* is to interpret the real aims and aspirations of the Russian people, as distinguished from and opposed to Soviet Communism, and to advance general knowledge of Russian culture, history and civilization. The Review invites contributions by authors of divergent views, but the opinions expressed in any individual article of this journal are not necessarily those of the editors.

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The Czechoslovak Legion*

By GEORGE F. KENNAN

... the cards were not all on the table and will not be until the passion of this whole situation dies out and the truth is allowed to come forth.

—Raymond Robins on the Czech uprising,
Bolshevik Propaganda, Hearings . . .
(1919).

THERE was, in the unfolding of events as between the Allies and Russia in the summer of 1918, no single factor that played a more significant role than the unique armed force known subsequently as the Czechoslovak Legion. This being so, it now becomes necessary to examine the curious origins of this body of men, and the situation in which it found itself in the spring of 1918.

Before the World War there were numbers of Czechs and Slovaks residing in some of the larger Russian cities, as well as a few Czech colonists in the countryside in Volhynia. The resentment in the historic provinces against Austrian rule, the romantic nationalism that marked the liberal movement of the nineteenth century, and the Pan-Slavic tendencies proceeding from Russia, had all served to create a bond between Russia and the protagonists of Czech autonomy or independence. Even stronger was the sentimental attachment to Russia on the part of the Slovak intellectuals who resented the Hungarian predominance in their own homeland.

When the World War broke out a special unit was set up within the Russian army called the *Druzhina*, the rank and file of which was made up predominantly of men from the Czech

*This is the first two excerpts dealing with the Czechoslovak Legion from the second volume of the author's study of Soviet-American relations between 1917 and 1920. This volume, entitled *The Decision to Intervene*, is to be published by the Princeton University Press in February, 1958. [Ed.]

colonies within the Russian Empire. The higher officers were chiefly Russians, but a few men of Czech origin who had been serving as regular officers in the Tsarist Army were also attached to this unit and given officers' rank. The *Druzhina* took part in the battles of the eastern front both north and south of the Carpathians, being used primarily for reconnaissance work.

During the course of the war large numbers of Czech and Slovak soldiers fighting in the Austro-Hungarian armies either deserted to the Russians or were taken prisoner by them, the two phenomena being frequently almost indistinguishable. The leaders of the Czech colony in Russia, as also the representatives of the Czechoslovak National Council established in 1916 in Paris, pressed to have these prisoners incorporated, together with the *Druzhina*, into a new Czechoslovak force which could take part in the World War on the side of the Allies.

During the Tsarist period, the Russian government remained generally unsympathetic to these urgings. There was a natural reluctance in Petrograd to encourage centrifugal tendencies anywhere, even in the camp of the enemy. The Russian Empire, like that of the Hapsburgs, was a multi-national entity. It was plain that if the principles of self-determination became triumphant in the lands of the Danube monarchy, it could easily spread to Russia and create similar disaffection there.

With the overthrow of the Tsar's government in March, 1917, these inhibitions ceased to exist. The Provisional Government took a more sympathetic attitude toward the Czechs and Slovaks and permitted the expansion of the *Druzhina* into an entire army corps through the rapid recruitment into its ranks of war prisoners and of Czechs and Slovaks working in Russian industrial plants. This unit, generally known as the Czech Corps, took part — and even distinguished itself — in the ill-fated Brusilov offensive in the summer of 1917. By the fall of the year it had grown to a point where it consisted of two full-fledged divisions with some supporting service units.

Professor Thomas Masaryk, the future president of the Czechoslovak Republic, had come to Russia in May, 1917, to weld the various Czechs and Slovaks in Russia into a single

faction and to make arrangements, if possible, for the removal of the Corps to the western front. He remained there throughout 1917 and served during that period as spokesman for the Corps vis-à-vis the Russian authorities. The unfavorable outcome of Brusilov's offensive and the rapid disintegration of the Russian army that set in immediately afterward made it clear that there was no longer any military future for the Czechs on the eastern front. Masaryk therefore redoubled the effort to find some way for them to leave Russia and to join the Allied forces in France. Negotiations to this end were in progress when the Bolshevik seizure of power occurred. The Bolshevik move to take Russia out of the war, together with the break between the Soviet government and the Ukrainian Rada placed the Corps, then stationed in the Ukraine, in a most awkward and ambiguous position. The Czechs immediately proclaimed their neutrality in the face of the Russian civil conflict; but as the only large body of men on the eastern front that had retained its discipline, its unity, and its loyalty to the Allied cause, the Corps found its position near the front an exposed and — in view of the overwhelming superiority of the forces of the Central Powers on the other side of the line — a dangerous one.

In December, 1917, an "autonomous Czechoslovak Army," made up of Czechs from the western countries, was recognized by the Allied governments as a regular Allied force and was subordinated to the French High Command. In the course of the winter it was arranged that the Czech Corps in Russia should become an integral part of this Czechoslovak Army, and agreement was reached with the French government that the Corps should be evacuated to France as rapidly as possible. In Petrograd Masaryk conducted negotiations to this end with the Soviet authorities. But the uncertainties prevailing during the negotiations with the Germans were such that no definite arrangements could be made before the final conclusion of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty. The Corps was stationed, throughout this period, in the area around and including Kiev. Having retained — in contrast to the Russian forces around it — a satisfactory military discipline, it was used primarily for guarding

war stores and ammunition dumps which otherwise, in view of the demoralization of the Russian soldiers, would have been left to the mercies of fate. By virtue of this function, plus the fact that it had seized extensive stocks of weapons from the enemy during the Brusilov offensive, the Corps was by this time relatively well armed.

From December to early February the Ukrainian territory on which the Czech Corps was stationed was, it will be recalled, under the somewhat tenuous rule of the Ukrainian Rada. It will further be recalled that on February 8 delegates of the Rada concluded a separate peace treaty with the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk just at the moment when their capital, Kiev, was falling to the invading Bolsheviks. These developments complicated still further the position of the Corps. It now found itself on the territory of a government which had made peace with its enemy. When, a few days later, the Germans resumed the offensive against Russia and German land forces began to penetrate the Ukraine, it was clear there was no time to be lost. It was decided, without further ado, to begin evacuation of the base area in the Ukraine and to seek exit from Russia via the Trans-Siberian Railway and Vladivostok. Believing on the basis of his own discussions with the Bolshevik leaders that they now had no objections to evacuation of the Corps via Vladivostok and supposing the Allied chiefs of mission (who had left Petrograd on February 28) to be also about to leave Russia by the same rout, Masaryk left Moscow for Vladivostok on March 6, en route to America and Europe, with a view to arranging for the shipping to transport the Corps from Vladivostok to Europe.

Meanwhile, the Corps was having a difficult time extracting itself from the western Ukraine. The German advance was so rapid that German forces intercepted its retreat at the railway junction of Bakhmach. In the days immediately following Masaryk's departure, sharp engagements were fought there — engagements in which the Czechs found themselves, by force of circumstances, fighting side by side with the Ukrainian Bolsheviks. With difficulty, the Czechs broke through the encirclement and continued their eastward movement in the direction of Kursk.

The Soviet government had, by this time, just completed its move to Moscow. On the first day of the meeting of the Congress of Soviets called to act on the ratification of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, the Soviet People's Commissars (*Sovnarkom*) found time to take cognizance of the situation of the Czech Corps. In what must — in the circumstances — have been very hasty and hectic deliberations, the *Sovnarkom* arrived at a formal decision to permit the Corps to proceed across Siberia and to depart from Russia via Vladivostok. This decision was communicated the following day, March 15, to the Czechs. A local agreement was at once made between the commanding officers of the Corps and the Bolshevik commander in the Ukraine, Antonov-Ovseyenko (later to be Soviet Minister in Czechoslovakia), for the entry of the Czechs onto the territory of the Russian Soviet Republic, with a view to their further transit eastward. On March 16, Antonov-Ovseyenko made an announcement acknowledging the "fraternal help" the Czechoslovaks had given to the Ukrainian proletariat "in their struggle against the imperialist looters," and said that the Bolshevik forces would "accept as a token of friendship the arms which the Czechoslovaks are leaving."¹

This last referred to an important provision of the arrangements the Czechs had made with Antonov-Ovseyenko: namely, that they would, before starting on their journey to Siberia, surrender to the Bolshevik forces a portion of the arms they held. This surrender appears to have been carried out at Kursk, on the very day of Antonov-Ovseyenko's announcement, by such of the Czech contingents as had already reached that point. The first trainloads of semi-disarmed Czechs were then permitted to start on the long trek eastward in the direction of Siberia and Vladivostok.

Immediately after this, difficulties began to develop. The precise source of these difficulties is unclear. Eduard Benes states in his memoirs that the attitude of the Soviet military authorities had changed as early as March 18, and that they began at that time to place difficulties in the path of the further

¹J. Bunyan, Ed. *Intervention, Civil War, and Communism in Russia: April-December 1918*, Baltimore, 1936, p.80.

eastward movement of the Corps – “their explanation being that the Czechoslovak Army might join Semyonov or the Japanese.”² It seems likely that the hitch in the arrangements was the result of Trotsky’s arrival in Moscow and assumption of the duties of Commissar for War on March 17. It was only natural that he, not having participated in the hasty decision of March 14 and having now the over-all military responsibility, should wish to review the terms on which the Czech force was to pass through Soviet territory. However that may be, it now became necessary for further negotiations to be conducted in Moscow in the ensuing days. While these talks were in progress, the movement of the Corps was delayed. The new negotiations led to a revision of the Soviet terms, spelled out in a telegram despatched by Stalin, as Commissar of Nationalities, to the Czechoslovak National Council on March 26. As set forth in this message, the Soviet government agreed to the evacuation of the Czechoslovak Corps via Siberia but only on three conditions:

- (a) That the evacuation should begin at once;
- (b) That the non-Communist Russian officers who still occupied the highest command positions in the Corps (referred to in the telegram as the “counter-revolutionary commanders”) be immediately removed; and
- (c) That the members of the Corps should proceed not as fighting units but as a group of free citizens, taking with them a certain quantity of arms for self-defense against the attack of counter-revolutionists.³

This decision was followed, the next day, by the conclusion at Penza (where the leading echelons of the Corps had now arrived) of a new and detailed agreement with the local Soviet military authorities, according to which each trainload of Czechs might have one armed company of 168 men, with rifles and a single trench mortar. Certain specified Russian commanders might, under this new agreement, be retained.⁴ With the conclusion of this agreement, movement of the force began

²Eduard Benes, *My War Memoirs*, London, 1928, p. 355.

³Bunyan, *op.cit.*, pp. 81-82.

⁴These included, above all, General Dietrichs (Dukhonin’s former Chief of Staff), General Kappel, and Colonel Ushakov.

again. Once more the long trainloads of boxcars containing the Czech soldiers began to roll eastward from central European Russia toward the Urals and Siberia.

But the situation remained very delicate. The Czechs, being suspicious of Bolshevik good faith and well aware that once their weapons were abandoned they would be at the mercy of others, did not actually surrender all the arms they were supposed to surrender. Considerable quantities were retained and concealed in the trains.

The next serious impediment to the movement of the Corps arose from the shock produced in Moscow by the Japanese landing in Vladivostok on April 5. The leaders of the Soviet government feared that the Japanese move was the precursor of some full-fledged intervention. This being the case, they at once became suspicious of the eastward movement of the Czechs. On April 7 orders were issued to halt the movement of the Corps across Siberia. A few days later, when the excitement over the Japanese action had subsided, the order was rescinded.

But the movement of the Corps had by this time become the subject of much tension and confusion. Conflicting orders were issued by various Soviet authorities, central and local. The Czech command itself was now widely dispersed. There were confusing variations in the inclination and ability of individual Czech commanders and Soviet officials to adjust amicably the many problems and incidents to which the passage of the Corps gave rise. The fears and suspicions of the Czechs themselves, furthermore, were now growing apace.

For this hardening of the Czech position, there were several reasons that deserve to be noted.

There was, in the first place, the influence on the Czech officers of those few Russian commanders who had remained with the Corps. These were, to a man, anti-Communist. To some extent, they were in touch with underground Russian oppositionist groups. Their influence was naturally committed to the encouragement of a stiffening of attitude on the part of the Czechs. On April 14, the commanders of the First Division of the Czech Corps, meeting at Kirsanov, not far from Penza,

arrived at a secret determination that it was impossible to rely on any agreement with the Bolsheviki, and agreed that the Czechs must be prepared to force their own passage, if this should prove necessary. This decision, later to become the position of the Corps as a whole, was one on which the Russian officers may be presumed to have had an important influence.

Added to this were the intensive efforts being made just at that time by the Soviet authorities to propagandize and disaffect the war prisoners in Russia, with a view to inducing them to embrace the Communist cause and to take up arms with local Red Guard units or the new Red Army. About mid-April — just at the time, in fact, when the Czech deliberations were in progress at Kirsanov — a congress of such disaffected prisoners was being held in Moscow. Some of the delegates were Czechs; and the purpose of the gathering — the conversion to the Communist cause of as many as possible of the war prisoner community in Russia — was addressed no less to the Czechs than to the other prisoners. Not only at this conference but also on the spot, wherever the Czech units found themselves, intensive efforts were made by the Bolsheviks to penetrate the Corps, to alienate the men from their officers, and to induce them to remain in Russia and take up arms on the Communist side.⁵ These efforts naturally caused alarm and resentment among the officers of the Corps. They also tended to split the rank and file into bitterly hostile and antagonistic elements. Since the officers of the Corps were well aware that the inspiration for these efforts came from the Soviet leaders themselves, it is no wonder that they were suspicious of the sincerity of the Soviet assurance of safe-conduct to Vladivostok, and reluctant — accordingly — to see the Corps surrender the last of its arms to the Soviet authorities.

A further source of Czech suspicion — and one that was to become increasingly important as the spring advanced — was

⁵The Moscow *Izvestiya*, No. 83, April 26, 1918, carried an account of these efforts to subvert the Czechoslovak Corps. The actual appeals to the men of the Corps were issued in the name of the Czechoslovak Section of the Russian Communist Party.

the belief, or assumption, that the difficulties the Corps was encountering were the result of German pressure on the Soviet authorities. This suspicion was greatly heightened, at the end of April, by the news of the arrival in Moscow of the new German ambassador, Count Mirbach. The thesis was, as will be seen in a later chapter, without foundation; but it permeated the Corps, caused the commanders to see in every Soviet official a concealed German agent and in every impediment arising in the path of the Corps a likely reflection of German designs.

While the Corps was thus making its uneasy passage eastward, the growing realization of its relative strength and speculation about its possible uses were beginning to agitate the Allied governments at home and their representatives in Russia.

To the British military planners at the headquarters of the Supreme War Council the idea seems to have occurred, at about the time of the ratification of the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, that the services of the Czech units in Russia might be used to good effect either in connection with the Japanese intervention in Siberia on which these British officers had set their hearts or — possibly, and as a second alternative — in connection with the operations which they now thought would be necessary to protect the north Russian ports from German encroachment. On April 1, the British War Office approached the Czechoslovak National Council, through the French government, with a communication expressing doubt that the Czech Corps could actually get to Europe via Siberia and voicing the view that it ought, therefore, to be used in Russia or Siberia. The English military authorities, Benes relates in his memoirs:

... held the opinion that it would be possible [for the Corps] to occupy Siberia in the region of Omsk, or else to proceed to Archangelsk where a military base could be established, from which communication with Siberia could be maintained by way of Perm. Finally, it might be possible to pass beyond Baikal and join Semyonov, and this latter solution was the one which the English favoured.⁶

Benes, after discussing the matter with the Chief of the French

⁶Benes, *op.cit.*, p. 357.

General Staff and with General Maurice Janin,⁷ replied with a letter to Clemenceau opposing any alteration of the plans for removing the Corps to France.

This remained, throughout the spring, the position of the Czechoslovak National Council and (until June) of Clemenceau himself. It did not, however, cause the British military authorities, and some of the French staff officers, to be weaned from their attachment to the idea of using the Corps in Russia. A vigorous effort was made by the British side at the military level of the Supreme War Council to get the sanction of the Council for this scheme. The first result was the insertion of a reference to the Czechs in the draft of a Joint Note submitted by the British to the Permanent Military Representatives at some time around the beginning of April. In this document, apparently drawn up on the basis of a memorandum prepared by Brigadier General H. W. Studd, the British military planners set forth their concept of a Siberian expedition grouped around the Japanese — a concept which they were continuing to push tenaciously despite Wilson's opposition. The document envisaged the advance of an Allied expeditionary force from Vladivostok to the area of the Urals, and possibly the Volga. The Japanese were to form the "mobile base or nucleus" of this force; but they were to enjoy, it was envisaged, "the eventual assistance of *Czech and other elements which can be organized on the spot.*"⁸

This document was approved by the Permanent Military Representatives, as Joint Note No. 20, on April 8. But General

⁷General Janin, of the French Army, had been stationed in Russia earlier in the war and had served as French military representative at the Russian field headquarters on the eastern front in 1916 and 1917. Here he had become acquainted with the affairs of the Czechoslovak units in Russia. At the end of 1917 the Czechoslovak National Council requested that he be designated by the French government as the over-all commander of the Czech forces everywhere, and this was done. He was subsequently, after the beginning of the intervention, sent to Siberia where he served as Chief of the French Military Mission and Commander-in-Chief of the French and British forces there. In the spring of 1918, however, he was still in Paris.

⁸National Archives, War Records Division, Record Group 120, Records of the American Expeditionary Forces. (Supreme War Council papers). Italics added.

Tasker H. Bliss, the American representative, abstained from taking a position on it, in view of the President's strong feelings that the Permanent Military Representatives ought not to concern themselves with political questions. And despite French acceptance of the Joint Note at the military level, the French government itself, and Clemenceau personally, remained undeviatingly averse to any diversion of the Czechs from the earliest possible passage to France.

Almost immediately after adoption of Joint Note No. 20 a new idea was broached which was evidently designed to achieve the retention of the Czech Corps in Russia without actually saying so. This was the idea of dividing the Corps, permitting all those who had already passed the Urals to continue toward Vladivostok, ostensibly for eventual removal to France, but routing the remainder to the ports of the Russian North — Murmansk and Archangel. Concerning the purpose of this proposed removal of a portion of the Corps to the Russian North there was, as we shall see shortly, some equivocation. The Czechs, and subsequently the Russians, were given the impression that the basic purpose was the evacuation of these units to France. There seems to have been no question, however, but that the thought uppermost in the minds of the authors of the project was that the removal to France might be long delayed and that meanwhile the units might come in handy for purposes of Allied occupation of the ports in question and the surrounding areas. It was then taken practically for granted in French and British circles that military steps to keep these regions out of German hands⁹ would soon be necessary.

By late April this scheme had found such favor in the thinking of French and British military authorities that it was brought

⁹The evidence of this will be found in the understanding of the scheme that was conveyed, at a very early date, to the operational echelons of the French and British forces. According to Henry Newbolt, (*History of the Great War*, 1931, Vol. V, p. 318) the mission of the British instructor staff despatched to Murmansk in May was "to train and organize the Czech corps, expected to number about 20,000 men, which would then be employed for the defense of North Russia." Newbolt also says that a French officer who arrived in Murmansk in May proposed to station 5,000 of the Czechs at Archangel and another 4,000 along the Murmansk railroad.

up for formal consideration at both the military and political levels of the Supreme War Council. On April 27 the Permanent Military Representatives at the Council, convening at Versailles, discussed in detail for the first time — on French initiative — the question of the future of the Czech Corps. The upshot of their discussion was another Joint Note (No. 25) in which they took note of discussions that had taken place between the French and British governments "on the subject of the transportation of [the] Czech contingents from Russia" and expressed the opinion:

I. That there is everything to be gained by securing their transportation at the earliest possible date.

II. That as the greatest possible rapidity can be assured by using Archangel and Murmansk, all Czech troops, which have not passed East of Omsk . . . should be despatched to these two ports.

A third point indicated that while these troops were waiting to be embarked . . . they could be profitably employed in defending Archangel and Murmansk and in guarding and protecting the Murman railway. Similarly, it was suggested, those troops which had passed Omsk might be used, as already recommended in Joint Note No. 20, to cooperate with the Allies in Siberia.¹⁰

The wording of this note, together with the fact that as much as six weeks later no serious move had yet been made by either government to provide shipping either at Vladivostok or at the northern ports, makes it very difficult to believe that the idea of dividing the Corps was anything other, in the minds of its authors, than a disingenuous one, designed to give perfunctory recognition to the principle of the eventual removal of the Czech units to France but actually to assure their availability for service in Russia in the event of Allied intervention.

Some days later (May 2), the subject came up for a rather confused discussion at the Fifth Session of the Supreme War Council itself, in Abbeville. The Allied statesmen had before them for consideration Joint Note No. 25 of the Permanent

¹⁰National Archives, War Records Division, RG.120 *op.cit.* (Supreme War Council papers).

Military Representatives. Clemenceau, who clung consistently to the position that the Czechs should be removed to the western front as rapidly as possible, was evidently suspicious of the motives of the authors of the Joint Note. He had no objection to routing a portion of the Corps via the northern ports, but he did want them to be promptly removed to France. He therefore pressed energetically for a clear commitment on the part of the British to attempt to find the necessary shipping. The British representatives somewhat grudgingly agreed to do their best, but voiced pessimism about the chances of finding enough ships to remove the entire Corps. Lord Milner, British Secretary of State for War urged that even in the case of Siberia the removal only of a portion of the Czech force should be envisaged and that "... the additional troops should be asked not to continue their journey to Vladivostok ... but ... should be detained near Omsk or Cheliabinsk."¹¹ He took the position that it would suffice if the Supreme War Council were simply to accept Joint Note No. 25. Clemenceau, still unsatisfied, argued that it would be desirable to embody the results of the discussion in more precise terms than those of the Joint Note. At his insistence, a resolution was drafted purporting to clarify the views of the senior statesmen on the subject; and the Council ended up by approving both Joint Note No. 25 and the draft resolution. Actually, the resolution, like many another product of the hurried deliberations of top level multilateral conferences, merely reflected the conflicting points of view without endeavoring to reconcile them, and brought no clarification into Allied policy. It read as follows:

(a) The British Government undertake to do their best to arrange the transportation of those Czech troops who are in Vladivostok or on their way to that port.

(b) The French Government undertake the responsibility for those troops until they are embarked.

(c) The British Government undertake to approach M. Trotsky with a view to the concentration at Murmansk and Archangel of those Czech troops not belonging to the Army Corps which has left Omsk for Vladivostok.¹²

¹¹*Ibid.*

¹²*Ibid.*

The upshot of the Abbeville conference was thus an agreement that the Corps should be split, one part of it being directed to the Pacific and the other to north Russia. But no real agreement had been achieved between the governments as to the desirability of its prompt removal to the western front.

The matter was duly taken up with the Soviet authorities at Moscow, as the resolution had envisaged — not only by Lockhart but also, apparently, by Lavergne and Sadoul. As to the dates of these discussions, the identity of principal participants, the content of what was conveyed to the Soviet authorities, and the precise reaction of the latter — evidence is conflicting and confusing.¹³ The most that can be said with any certainty is that the matter *was* discussed; that the reaction of the Soviet authorities was not unfavorable; that Chicherin issued some sort of an order to the local Soviets along the railway, designed to implement the scheme; and that nothing in the reports of the Allied representatives in Russia to their governments during the month of May suggested that any applicable difficulties had arisen.¹⁴ The Allied chanceries were thus left under the impression that the project was in process of implementation. Actually, it was almost immediately overtaken and vitiated, unbeknownst initially to the Allied governments, by a further series of events in Russia and Siberia, of which it now becomes necessary to take note.

¹³Whoever feels the inclination to exercise himself in the untangling of contradiction in historical sources on a minor point will do well to examine the statements on these questions of Bunyan, *op.cit.*, p. 74; Joseph Noulens, *Mon Ambassade en Russie Soviétique*, 1933, Vol. II, p. 84; Jacques Sadoul, *Notes sur la Révolution Bolchevique*, 1920, p. 338; R. H. Lockhart, *British Agent*, 1933, p. 269; and the American Military Attaché, Ruggles, in *Foreign Relations, 1918, Russia*, Vol. II, p. 158. There is some question whether the representatives in Moscow did not actually anticipate the deliberations of the Supreme War Council. Lockhart, as will be seen below, mentioned to Robins in a letter of May 5 that Trotsky had already agreed to send the Czechs to Murmansk and Archangel.

¹⁴Trotsky later indicated that he asked only for assurance that shipping would actually be provided to remove the Czechs from Murmansk and Archangel, but that since Lockhart was unable to give such assurance the talks remained "inconclusive." L. Trotsky, *Sochineniya*, 1926, Vol. XVII, pp. 478-480.

Hungary and the Soviet Idea of War

By ALVIN J. COTTRELL AND JAMES E. DOUGHERTY

THERE has been a widespread tendency in the West since the "meeting at the summit" in Geneva during July, 1955 to believe that the United States and the Soviet Union, recognizing the catastrophic horrors of thermonuclear war, have reached a *de facto* agreement to eschew military conflict. This interpretation was substantiated to a considerable degree by the events of the first week of November, 1956. Despite the fact that the Soviet Union, at the height of the Hungarian crisis, frantically reinforced its East German garrison and sent additional divisions into Poland, Czechoslovakia, and Hungary, the North Atlantic treaty partners did not publicly demonstrate that they regarded these large-scale Soviet movements as involving an unfavorable shift in the balance of ground forces in Europe. In fact, the Western nations seemed to be at pains to assure the Soviet Union that, notwithstanding their sympathy for the goals of the liberation fighters, they would not exploit the events in the satellite countries to the detriment of Soviet border security. West German Foreign Minister Heinrich von Brentano spoke for practically all the members of NATO when he counselled East Germans not to attempt an uprising. If it is true that the two major Cold War antagonists, each fearing the annihilation of his homeland, have arrived at an understanding, albeit inarticulate, that they must not become directly embroiled with each other in military conflict, then an interesting new phase of international relations has begun.

The mistake made by many in the West, however, has been to assume that the appearance of this new phase of international relations implies the reduction of *conflict* and the substitution of *competition* for conflict. The emphasis in Soviet propaganda

on "peaceful, competitive coexistence," especially since the death of Stalin and the achievement of the mononuclear capability by the U.S.S.R. in 1953, has struck a responsive chord in the liberal, Western business-like mind. Western sociologists have frequently distinguished between impersonal, unconscious competition among individuals or groups for a share of economic goods which are in limited supply and, on the other hand, conflict as a process of conscious, antagonistic managed struggle over goals which are mutually incompatible. But the West has thus far failed to grasp the central role of conflict in Soviet operational doctrine and the variety of forms which it may take. The West has generally accepted the term "peaceful competitive coexistence" according to its own concept of competition, just as in the past it has been willing to accept the Soviet Communist terms — "democracy," "free elections," "imperialism," and so forth — as though they meant the same thing to the Soviets as they did to the West. Whereas the West looks upon competition as a process quite different from conflict, these two processes flow into each other in Soviet strategic thinking.

Communist doctrine is, in essence, a dialectical theory of total conflict between systems which is supposed to last for an indefinite period and lead ultimately to world victory for Communism. Although the Communist goal of world domination is indeed a total one, it does not necessarily imply the same kind of total military conflict which has characterized Western-style warfare in the twentieth century. The Communist attitude toward warfare is rooted in the fact that, both as an ideology and as a socio-economic system which was much weaker than the capitalist order which it sought to overthrow, Soviet Communism had to fight from an inferior position. The Communist system, unable to engage a technologically superior West in traditional military warfare, at which the West excelled, was obliged to resort to methods of irregular conflict which has been all but forgotten in the "century of total war." The Communists have long recognized that war and peace are relative concepts. For them, military conflict is only one means of carrying on warfare and can be effectively alternated with political, psychological, economic, and other means. Moreover, the Marx-

ian doctrine of insoluble conflict furnishes a concept of the whole world as a battlefield. Perhaps it is more accurate to say that the Communists, like the early adherents of Islam, divide the world into an abode of peace and an abode of war; the "peace territory" is to be constantly extended outward as a result of conflict in the "war territory." It is significant to note that, since 1945, the Communists have made the non-Communist world the "war territory," and they have attempted, with a good deal of success, to confine the Cold War to that part of the world outside their own borders.

It is important to understand that in Soviet strategic thinking wars do not occur in splendid isolation, but rather they are part of an over-all pattern. The Western military writer who exerted the greatest influence on Lenin and consequently upon the development of the Soviet attitude toward war was Clausewitz. Clausewitz' famous dictum, "War is the continuation of politics by other means," expresses very accurately the Soviet attitude toward war as an instrument of national policy. As the Russian military authority, Boris M. Shaposhnikov, stated: "If war is the continuation of politics, only by other means, so also peace is a continuation of struggle, only by other means."¹

Each Soviet foreign policy move is conceived merely as an installment in a larger strategic plan. The purpose of each action is not to gain an immediate smashing victory, but rather to enhance the relative power position of the Soviet Union and the Communist system at the expense of the Western capitalist nations. Foolhardy decisions which may jeopardize gains already made must be assiduously avoided. Some of the earliest and most miserable failures in the history of the Communist movement were attributable to an excess of ideological zeal on the part of particular revolutionary leaders, such as Trotsky, Zinoviev, Kamenev, Bukharin, Rykov, Kun, and the German Spartacists. These leaders had too much faith in the inevitable triumph of their cause, coming as the result of the dialectic process of history. Frequently, their preoccupation with theory vitiated

¹Boris M. Shaposhnikov. *Mozg Armii* (The Brain of the Army), Vol. 3, Moscow-Leningrad, 1929, p. 239. Cited in Raymond L. Garthoff, *Soviet Military Doctrine*, Glencoe, Free Press, 1953, p. 11.

their sense of sound tactics, proper timing, and disciplined patience.

The more mature, more cautious approach to conflict in international relations was reflected very clearly in an operational principle which Kark Radek, one time Secretary of the Comintern Executive Committee, had defined in 1934: "The object of the Soviet Government is to save the soil of the first proletariat state from the criminal folly of a new war . . . The defense of peace and of the neutrality of the Soviet Union against all attempts to drag it into the whirlwind of a world war is the central problem of Soviet foreign policy."² This fundamentally constituted the basis of foreign policy to which the Soviet Union reverted immediately following the Second World War, when the United States possessed a monopoly of atomic weapons. Until this unfavorable international power situation could be changed, Stalin was determined to do nothing that might provoke the United States into undertaking a war against the Soviet Union. This became evident at the time of the Iranian crisis in 1946. When Great Britain and the United States showed signs of stiffening at the Soviet failure to meet the deadline for the withdrawal of great power forces from Iran, Stalin ordered the troops to leave rather than precipitate an open dispute. From that time until after the death of Stalin, the Soviet Union seemed to turn its attention away from the Middle East, concentrating its efforts instead on Europe and the Far East.

In Europe, the Communists shifted primarily to a psychological warfare approach to counter the American-sponsored economic and military programs designed to strengthen Western Europe. While developing the atom bomb with the aid of German scientists, the leaders of the Kremlin kept uppermost in their strategic thinking the danger of bringing on a showdown with the United States. The Berlin blockade furnishes an illuminating example of the manner in which the Soviet Union can apply principles of psychological warfare to a conflict situation and maintain ultimate control of that situation in such a way as to preclude an unwanted military showdown.

²Karl Radek. "The Bases of Soviet Foreign Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 12, January, 1934, p. 206.

Throughout the first postwar decade, the Kremlin leaders depended primarily upon a psychological warfare approach to counter the effect of the American-sponsored economic and military programs which were designed to strengthen Western Europe. Constant repetition of Communist propaganda succeeded in conditioning European popular opinion to be increasingly sensitive to American objectives. A considerable segment of European opinion — liberal, pacifist, socialist and neutralist — was alienated by the continuation of the U. S. nuclear experiments, the decision to rearm Germany, the cost of NATO defenses, and the construction of U. S. air bases on Europe's farm soil. Meanwhile, the Soviet Union, attempting to effect a tactical juncture between its objective of shoving the West out of Asia and Africa and its objective of bringing about the disintegration of the Western alliance, tried to push the United States into an uncomfortable middle position between the national aspirations of the colonial peoples and the commercial-strategic interests of the European colonial powers. So well did the Soviet political campaign against the West seem to be progressing that, according to the principles of Soviet strategy, it would have been sheer folly for the Soviet Union to allow itself to be dragged into a war. When the Communists decided to test the firmness of American intentions in the Far East, they acted indirectly, by inducing the puppet regime of North Korea to launch an attack in June, 1950. Moreover, Moscow parried the affirmative and probably unexpected American response to that aggression by persuading the Chinese Communist regime to enter the war. Even though the U.S.S.R. supplied arms to the North Korean-Chinese forces and exploited the war along the Thirty-Eighth Parallel for the purpose of training Russian pilots,³ the Russians did not allow themselves to become drawn directly into war. When the Communist forces in Korea were being pressed by the United States until there was a danger that the Communists might be compelled to abandon previously held territory, the Russians, far from threatening the

³Brigadier General James Ferguson, United States Air Force, "The Role of Tactical Air Forces," *The United States Air University Quarterly Review*, Summer 1954, pp. 31-32.

West with a general war, suggested that negotiations for a truce be opened. By using proxy methods of carrying on the conflict in Asia — not only in Korea but also in Malaya and Indochina — the U.S.S.R. was able to exploit the legal-mindedness of the Western nations and the political naïvete of the Asians to evade responsibility for actions which were controlled from Moscow. While it sought to escape the danger of a major war, it strove feverishly to narrow the technological-geographic superiority of the United States, by perfecting its strategic air capabilities, developing the intercontinental ballistic missile, and by supporting the various indigenous anti-colonial and nationalist movements in Asia and the Arab world, with the ultimate purpose of neutralizing the West's vital air bases in North Africa, the Middle East, and the Pacific.⁴

Following the Soviet breakthrough into the realm of thermonuclear power, the Kremlin leadership felt capable of introducing tactical innovations that went beyond the postwar Communist tactics, which stressed the penetration of contiguous areas and which depended upon the Sino-Soviet superiority in conventional armies and guerilla warfare methods. For the first time in their history, the Soviets were able to "leap over" the Western treaty barriers into the rimland areas to which they had always been denied strategic access. By carefully devising proxy arms deals, the Soviet Union was able to extend its influence to Guatemala, Egypt, and through Egypt indirectly to Algeria (just as it has more recently penetrated into Syria and Yemen with arms). In all of these cases, Soviet strategy has been designed to intensify the conflict in the non-Communist "war zone."

One of the most important aspects of the Hungarian crisis of October, 1956 was the fact that, for the first time since the beginning of the Cold War, a type of conflict which the Com-

⁴Charles J. V. Murphy describes the feverish Soviet effort in this way: "By leaping so rapidly and on so broad a scale into the development of an intercontinental bomber, the Russians' obvious strategy is to raise a counterdeterrent to SAC. The big force of medium-range jet bombers that they are assembling fits logically into such a strategy . . . Its principal function is no doubt to knock out SAC's peripheral bases at the outset of hostilities." "The New Air Situation," *Fortune*, September 1955, p. 224.

munist high command did not instigate and which it could not fully control broke out inside the borders of the Communist "peace zone," which had hitherto been considered immune from such disturbances. The fears which the Hungarian rising struck in the minds of the Soviet leadership — fears of a chain reaction of such disturbances throughout the satellite empire and fears that the entire ideological edifice of Communism might suddenly collapse — furnished ample evidence of the colossal Soviet failure to establish a real zone of peace and stability in Eastern Europe after eleven years of occupation. The events in Hungary further demonstrated the questionability of long-held Western assumptions concerning the deployment of Soviet forces in East Germany and the satellite states of Eastern Europe, viz., that these forces were poised for an all-out attack on Western Europe. While this indeed may have been, in the thinking of some Soviet strategists, one of the reasons for their presence, a more important reason was to hold the subject nationalities in check until the process of Communization could be completed. But, once the revolutionary spirit flared in Budapest, the Soviet Union found that not only was it unable to rely upon the satellite army which it had created: it was not even able to rely fully on its own forces stationed in Hungary.⁵ Hungary showed that the Soviet conventional

⁵George Fisher gives the following account of an episode which occurred on October 25, 1956 just two days after the revolt began: "A crowd of about 2,000 people, on their way to the Parliament building to demand Gerö's removal and the withdrawal of the Soviet forces, met with four Soviet tanks guarding the approaches to the Parliament building. At the sight of the unarmed crowd the tank crews reacted in a surprising manner. Instead of shooting at the demonstrators they allowed them to hoist the Hungarian flag on the vehicles, and then proceeded with them towards the Parliament building. As the demonstrators arrived in the large open square in front of the Parliament building, together with the Soviet tanks, the A. V. H. formations, established in the surrounding buildings, opened fire. Hundreds of people fell dead on the ground. This frightful slaughter was stopped by the Soviet tank-crews, who turned their guns on the A. V. H. men on the rooftops, and with their help the survivors were able to escape from the square." "Twelve Days of Freedom," in *Hungary, October 1956*, A Bulletin of the Committee on Science and Freedom, No. 8, April, 1957. p. 34.

armed strength had been much lower than the West had previously estimated it to be. It should be kept in mind that a sizeable fraction of the Soviet ground force in Europe is required to retain control over the local populations, whereas the American forces stationed in Europe under NATO and Strategic Air Command agreements are present with the express consent of the governments involved and, since they are free of all local police duties, can be fully utilized in any military contingency which might arise in Europe. This helps to explain the belated adoption by the Soviet Union of the "NATO formula" to govern the relation of Soviet troops with the Polish Communist regime of Wladislaw Gomulka.

It is reasonable to conclude from the foregoing that the Western nations misunderstood the strategic situation in Europe, as well as Soviet strategic thinking in general, at the time of the Hungarian crisis. When the legitimate Hungarian government of Imre Nagy, after the withdrawal of Soviet forces from Budapest, proclaimed Hungary's neutrality and appealed to the United Nations for a guarantee of that neutrality, the Western nations and especially the United States seemed to take it for granted that any purely political step toward recognizing the Nagy government might constitute a *casus belli* from the Soviet point of view. There is nothing in the history of Soviet strategic thought, however, to lead us to conclude that the rulers of the Kremlin would have taken the initiative in precipitating a general war because of a purely political act on the part of the West.

The Hungarian tragedy illustrates vividly the degree to which the policy-makers and the public in the United States have implicitly accepted the Soviet-defined rules of the global conflict. It is invariably assumed that, for the sake of maintaining a wide safety margin for peace, the West must from time to time be willing to arrive at a compromise settlement to military conflict, as it did both in Korea and Indochina, without ever inflicting any territorial losses upon the Communists. It is equally assumed that the Soviet Union could not be made to accept any limited military or political defeat without casting the die for general war. As a consequence of this type of reasoning, a situation

has developed in which the territory of the Soviet empire is considered "off limits" for conflicts, while the Soviet Union remains free to engage in all sorts of conflict management on the territory of the non-Communist world. Thus the United States unconsciously conceives the global conflict according to the terms laid down by the Communists: the Sino-Soviet empire, with all the satellites, is the "zone of peace," while the Western world, along with the so-called "grey areas" constitutes the battle zone. As a result of the stereotypes which Communist propagandists have foisted upon the Western world, all debates in the United Nations over "threats to peace," "imperialism," and other political disputes from 1946 until 1956 were concerned with problems and tensions arising in the non-Communist world (as if the United Nations had formally subscribed to the categories contained in "Stalin's last thesis"). This type of analysis, which is based uncritically on the Soviet formulations for world conflict, is fraught with even subtler, yet more significant consequences. It means that if the West and the Communist bloc continue to alternate in winning rounds in the Cold War, the situation would favor Communist strategy, because each time the West scores a victory, as it did, for example in Jordan during May, 1957, it does no more than preserve the international *status quo*; whereas when the Soviets score a victory, as they appeared to in Syria during the latter part of August, 1957, they acquire territory within an historically Western sphere of influence, unless the West takes necessary counter-measures to roll them back.

It is within such a conceptual framework that the events in Hungary, and their aftermath, take on such enormous importance. The spirit of revolutionary independence, which had for at least a decade appeared to operate to the exclusive advantage of the Communists in their campaign against the West, was for once turned against the Soviet Union. It appeared unexpectedly in a part of the Communist orbit which was extremely sensitive to explosive developments, because the Hungarian rising threatened the entire Soviet Communist structure, both strategically and ideologically. The great tragedy of Hungary lay in the West's failure to analyze the situation in the

light of the Soviet idea of war and to exploit this knowledge for the purpose of forcing the Soviets to seek a more imaginative, non-military solution to the problem, in much the same way as they forced us to solve the Berlin blockade. It was the West's political fear and indecision, flowing from an utter lack of comprehension as regards the Soviet doctrine of war, which permitted Moscow to take the easiest and the bloodiest way out.

Law and Morality

The Legal Philosophy of Lev Petrazhitsky

By G. C. GUINS

FIFTY years ago, in 1907, Professor Lev Petrazhitsky of the University of St. Petersburg, Russia, published the first edition of his remarkable work on legal philosophy, *Teoriya prava i gosudarstva v svyazi s teoriei npravstvennosti* (*A Theory of Law and State in Connection with a Theory of Morality*). This two-volume work has been translated into English and is published at present in an abbreviated form under the title *Law and Morality*.¹

Petrazhitsky's biography is at the same time the history of a great scientific achievement. Petrazhitsky began his scientific career in Germany, assigned by the Russian government to a special seminar created by the Russian Ministry of Education in Berlin for Russian professional aspirants. The seminar was headed by Professor Dernburg, at that time the greatest living expert in Roman and Civil Law.

¹*Law and Morality* by Leon Petrazycki. Translated by Hugh W. Babb, with an Introduction by Nicholas S. Timasheff. Cambridge, Mass. Harvard University Press, 1955. The 20th Century Legal Philosophy Series (Vol. VII).

Professor Leon Petrazycki was of Polish ancestry, born in 1867 in the territory annexed by Russia in 1772. He studied at the University of Kiev, was granted the position of "professorial aspirant," and after several years of study in Berlin was awarded a doctoral degree in Russia. He began to teach in Kiev, and soon attained the Chair of Legal Encyclopedia and Philosophy of Law at the University of St. Petersburg. In 1906 he was elected to the State Duma from St. Petersburg. After the Revolution in 1917 he left for Poland and died in Warsaw in 1931. In this article Petrazycki's name is transliterated "Petrazhitsky," corresponding to the Russian pronunciation and spelling of his name used in his works published in Russian. Hereafter his work *Law and Morality* is referred to as "Petrazhitsky."

While studying in Berlin Petrazhitsky published several works in German. These indicated that the young author was already not only an outstanding expert in Roman Law but also an innovator in the method of interpretation of various institutions of Roman Law. The distinctiveness of Petrazhitsky's method consisted in the appraisal of various institutions of Roman Law from the point of view of their ethical value and material expediency. Through this method he succeeded in proving the reasonableness of some obscure regulations of Roman Law and in explaining their meaning.²

Just at this time the draft of the first German Civil Code (*Buergerliches Gesetzbuch*) was published in Germany, giving rise to lively discussion. Following nationalist trends, German legislators included some principles of old German law in the Civil Code, considering them more suitable to Germany than the adopted principles of Roman Law. Petrazhitsky took part in these discussions and proved the superiority of Roman institutions, partly from the ethical, partly from the economic point of view. His interest in the German draft of the Civil Code led him to outline ideas concerning law-making in general and to consider the possibility of creating a new science, Legal Policy.³ After his return to Russia he developed these ideas with more details and illustrations in a series of articles published in the periodical of Kiev University (*Kievskie Universitetskie Izvestia*, 1896-97), under the title *Introduction to the Science of Legal Policy*.

Petrazhitsky was unable to find in the contemporary theory of law an essential basis for developing his new branch of legal science, the "Policy of Law." It was necessary, he believed, to discover how legal provisions act; what positive and negative motives of behavior they can stimulate; and what mass conduct they can consolidate. He had thus to explain the causative action of law.

²See Leo von Petrazycki, *Die Fruchtverteilung beim Wechsel des Nutzungsberechtigten* (1892), and *Die Lehre vom Einkommen* (1893-95) with an appendix to the second volume of that work entitled *Civil Politik und Politische Oekonomie*.

³Appendix to the *Lehre vom Einkommen* (see footnote 2).

As he later formulated his plan: "The construction of a scientific and adequate theory of the action of law presupposes an examination of the nature of law . . . The theory of the casual action of law as a psychic process must be a psychological theory."⁴

It was for this reason that after his return to Russia Petrazhitzky, although already a renowned expert in the field of Roman Law, preferred accepting the Chair of Encyclopedia and Philosophy of Law to continuing his studies in Roman Law. His lectures on the Theory of Law attracted large audiences. They opened wide horizons, far beyond the habitual limits of professional jurisprudence. Now, fifty years later, when mankind is eager to build a new world order based on the principles of the rule of law, when it is becoming clear that peace cannot be guaranteed unless it is supported by respect for law and justice, Petrazhitzky's doctrine may find resonance on a still wider scale than at the beginning of this century.

People must be educated in respect for law from childhood, said Petrazhitzky:

The law "does not regard the person," it raises "the little people" to the elevation of "the great ones" of this world. Consequently a healthy and adequately intense consciousness of one's rights exerts an important educative influence upon one. It makes him "a citizen" in character and conscious of his own dignity. It saves him from faults of character and conduct which develop when there is no proper consciousness of one's own dignity and self-respect and which are traditionally associated with such terms as a "slavish" or "servile" spirit.

Parents and educators should devote serious attention to the development of a strong and vivid legal consciousness in children and be concerned to impress upon them law, not morality only. Moreover, it is important to develop both sides of law, suggesting not only the rights of others (and their sanctity and strong respect for them) but also the individual pupil's rights (and respect for them) in precisely the same way . . . A child brought up in an atmosphere of arbitrary caprice (however beneficent and gracious), with no definite assignment to him of a particular sphere of rights (although of a modest and childish character), will not be trained to construct and carry out the plans of life with assurance. In the economic field, particularly, he will be deficient in confidence, boldness, and initiative: he will be apathetic, act at random, and procrastinate.

⁴Petrazhitzky, pp. 324-25.

tinat in the hope of favorable "chances," help from another, alms, gifts, and the like.⁵

Petrzhitsky's words concerning the education of teen-age youngsters may easily be adapted to the education of adults living under the Communist regime. With no confidence in their rights, accustomed to hear only of duties, they are losing consciousness of human dignity and initiative in their personal activity and are becoming apathetic in the economic field.⁶

To present-day readers some of Petrzhitsky's words may appear prophetic. He warned that "unsuccessful law may spread demoralization and poison the national spirit"⁷ and he advocated a special study of the meaning and significance of law, both public and private, from its motivative and educative points of view.

In order to ground the new legal science, the Policy of Law, Petrzhitsky had to explain what he understood under the motivated and educative functions of law, but this task presupposed, in turn, as Petrzhitsky saw himself, an understanding of the nature of law. Thus, the prospects of scientific exploration expanded more and more. Petrzhitsky first of all investigated the fields of logic and psychology. He found that "the teachings of contemporary logicians as to formation and definition of concepts were insufficient."⁸ He constructed his own doctrine with regard to concepts,⁹ and transferred to legal science the methods of the exact sciences, based on the principles of inductive logic formulated by J. S. Mill.

Petrzhitsky did not find a category in contemporary psy-

⁵Petrzhitsky, pp. 98-99.

⁶Numerous examples of that apathy and other bad consequences of the Communist regime are cited in this writer's work, *Communism on the Decline*, M. Nijhoff, The Hague, 1956.

⁷Petrzhitsky, p. 301.

⁸See Timasheff's "Introduction" to Petrzhitsky's *Law and Morality*, p. xxiii.

⁹As a brilliant jurist, Petrzhitsky successfully adapted juridical logic, which demands particular carefulness and exactness in definitions (*omnis definitio periculosa est*) to the formation of adequate concepts in general. See G. Guins, L. I. Petrzhitsky "Characterization of the Scientific Creativeness of Petrzhitsky," 1931. *Yur. Fac. v Kharbine*, No. 5, Section III, p. x.

chology to which he could refer such phenomena as a duty-consciousness plus will to do, or right-consciousness plus readiness to defend it. Legal experience, as he understood it, was at the same time "cognitive, emotional and volitional," and Petrazhitsky therefore undertook a special experimental study of complicated mental processes, which he denominated as "emotional" or "impulsions." He included his analysis of complex psychic experiences in his *Introduction to the Study of Law and Morality* (1905).¹⁰

Petrazhitsky's research in the field of psychology is important for understanding his doctrine concerning the motivative and educative action of law, and its significance in social and cultural life, as a factor of human conduct and formation of the national character. He emphasized that the reality of law consisted not in legal provisions themselves, established in the form of statutes, customs, precedents, etc., but in specific complex mental experiences which accompany any consciousness of duty or right. In such a consciousness originate specific impulses to act, or to abstain from actions, or to tolerate certain actions of other people.

II

Petrazhitsky's next step was to determine more specifically what is the genuine nature of law.

Having stated that the reality of law consists in experiences of a psychic character, Petrazhitsky expounded in his main work, *Theory of Law and State*, the affinity and differences between law and morality. Both law and morality regulate human behavior. Both create various motives to do, or to abstain, or to tolerate. Each is a specific kind of ethics. There is however, an essential difference between law and morality. Moral impulsions are free; moral obligations may not be claimed from others. It is because of this that one speaks of a "purely moral obligation" when he cannot assert a legal obligation but expects a certain moral act on the part of another person.

¹⁰Since the development of the Gestalt school, modern psychology recognizes such complicated mental processes, but Petrazhitsky's terminology does not coincide with that commonly used in the field of modern psychology.

Correspondingly Petrazhitsky characterizes moral impulses as unilateral and as not binding or coercive, and he calls them "imperative." On the other hand, legal impulsions are connected with the consciousness of a right to demand or claim. Legal obligations are coercive and bilateral. Petrazhitsky characterizes them as "imperative-attributive," and he adds to that characteristic a number of essential differences between law and morality, such as the precision and definiteness of legal obligations and rights, and the indefinite content of moral obligations; the formulism of law and its tendency to a single pattern; the significance of motives in moral acts and the insignificance of motives in the fulfillment of legal obligations; but, first and foremost, the repressive character of law. Morality, on the other hand, is characterized by its caritative impulsions and dispositions of love, gratitude, and so forth. In cases where moral duty is not fulfilled there is no basis for malicious or vengeful reactions. But morality has a sublime quality and a powerful influence on the formation of legal principles. For example, the sublime ethics of Christianity have transformed many principles of law and thus some obligations originally purely "imperative" finally have become "imperative-attributive." "There are many examples of such development," says Petrazhitsky, "in the history of modern European nations."¹¹ Who can deny, in fact, that a new religion which condemns slavery, polygamy, or genocide, would influence the corresponding development of law?

III

Any group of people living together needs law, but for a large society law is indispensable as the conduct of people living together must be coordinated and unified. Petrazhitsky has set forth this function of law very emphatically.

If some ascribe legal obligations to others and corresponding rights to themselves, and those others do not acknowledge the existence of such obligations-rights (either in general or to the extent asserted by the other side), this represents a psychological ground for dangerous dissensions and conflicts, bitterness, violence and bloodshed.

¹¹Petrazhitsky, p. 95.

Associated with this on the ground of, and explained by, socio-cultural adaptation, is the tendency of law to development and adaptation in the direction of bringing the legal opinions of the parties into unity, and coincidence . . . and — so far as may be — to exclude or eliminate discord. The tendency (which is alien to morality) may be called briefly the unifying tendency.¹²

Problems of the unification of human conduct belong to social psychology and in part to sociology, two disciplines which were still in an embryonic stage when Petrazhitsky was working out his doctrine fifty years ago. On the basis of modern social psychology it is easier to explain why people belonging to the same social group, or having the same class interests, or living in the atmosphere of the same ideas concerning goodness and decency, adopt similar concepts of good and bad, have similar views with regard to justice, and follow similar patterns of behavior. Imitation, suggestion, and psychological contagion are the main factors of both unification and changes.

Every thinking man acquires dispositions of a positive or tentative character toward various kinds of conduct. His appraisals of good and bad, reasonable and unsuitable, expedient and advantageous are based on his personal experience, education and devotions. His legal consciousness and impulses are independent, based on an inner conviction of himself or of the group of persons among whom he is living. Petrazhitsky calls this kind of legal consciousness "intuitive" law. However, not everybody is capable of formulating his ideas of justice, and, besides, no social organization can exist unless its members obey the authorities and follow a "preordained pattern of corresponding precepts, settled customs, and the like . . ." ¹³ Hence originates "positive" law, the main support of the legal order of every period.

Petrazhitsky's distinction between intuitive and positive law is one of the most fruitful ideas of his philosophy of law.

Positive law is a basis of every social organization. Social coexistence educates in discipline, recognition of authorities and orders, following a habitual pattern and routine and borrowing principles and ideas from leaders and teachers. It is a common

¹²Petrazhitsky, pp. 112-13.

¹³*Ibid.*, p. 226.

rule which finds its manifestation in various spheres of social and cultural life. Reference to the opinions of reliable persons, conduct in conformity with the established customs (the power of fact), and, finally, the popularity of maxims and sayings, may be discerned not only in the field of law, but in religion and the arts as well. Positive law belongs to the same class of social phenomena. It is not based on inner conviction like intuitive law (though under normal conditions it may be in accordance with it); its force is grounded on references to various normative circumstances, such as orders or opinions of the authorities and government institutions, or such factual conditions as customs or precedents; or, finally, on universally adopted principles or widely-spread leading ideas concerning right and wrong. No wonder that positive law is better adapted for furnishing uniform patterns or rules. Questions of a formal or technical character can be regulated only by positive law.

The interaction between intuitive and positive law is of great importance. Petrazhitsky devoted a special chapter to that problem.¹⁴ He emphasized, in particular, the revolutionary role of intuitive law when conservative and obsolete positive law no longer satisfies the needs of the country and does not correspond to the new legal consciousness. On the other hand, stressed Petrazhitsky, drastic change of a legal order in the name of progress may fail unless it corresponds to the level of social psychology. His predictions with regard to the potential (at the beginning of this century) socialist reforms became completely justified by the Soviet reality.¹⁵

¹⁴Petrazhitsky, Section 31, pp. 225-240.

¹⁵Cf. Petrazhitsky, p. 311 (note). Petrazhitsky's comments on the legal aspects of socialism, as for example its inevitable bureaucratic regulations, because of the predominance of public law, and unavoidable overgrowth of auxiliary stimuli, penalties and rewards, because of lack of interest on the part of the workers, have been used and developed by this writer (see G. C. Guins, *Soviet Law and Soviet Society*, 1954, and *Communism on the Decline*, 1956). Some of Petrazhitsky's ideas on the subject are omitted in the condensed American edition of *Law and Morality*.

IV

Studying and explaining the nature of law and its social functions, Petrazhitsky gradually approached the main part of his project. Having completed the *Theory of Law and State*, he began a sociological survey designed to explain the formation and development of leading political ideas and legal principles. Unfortunately, the Revolution of 1917 interrupted his scientific activity. He escaped to Poland but his manuscripts remained in Petrograd and the Soviet authorities for many years refused to return them to the author.

Had Petrazhitsky completed his scientific program, his doctrine could probably have gained assent from a large group of representatives of both the positivist and idealist schools of law.¹⁶ In fact it was received without enthusiasm by many Russian scholars. The psychological approach to the study of law seemed to them — and this is still the prevailing view of his theory—either superfluous or misleading. Among the reasons for such a critical attitude toward his theory are some peculiarities of his work. As an innovator, Petrazhitsky gave too much emphasis to the method of introspection, which he used widely for the analysis of psychological experiences in general and legal experience in particular. He stressed individual legal experience and subjective law. He even denied the existence of "objective" law and characterized it as a kind of "phantasm."¹⁷ All this gave Petrazhitsky's critics reason to reproach him for his solipsism. However, Petrazhitsky was not a solipsist. He explained the connection of legal order with legal psychology, and this is his great contribution. Law regulates human conduct, and the science of human behavior is psychology. It is indisputable that one cannot understand the behavior of other people unless he understands his own and that he is incapable of understanding at all what he has not experienced himself. That is the reason why Petrazhitsky recommended applying the method of introspection to the examination of legal experience.

But when Petrazhitsky began to utilize sociology to explain the development of legal institutions and legal ideas, his first

¹⁶See Professor Timasheff's Introduction, pp. xxviii.

¹⁷Petrazhitsky, 62-63; 153-54.

sociological surveys promised more emphasis both on the legal order and on the significance of ideological movements and, in particular, of ideals of law.¹⁸

Petrzhitsky was, as we know, an excellent jurist and he could not ignore official law and the role of the state and legislation, and of dogmatic study of law for practical needs. He distinguished a purely theoretical approach to the study of law from an applied science of legal provisions (norms), without rejecting the necessary elements of the traditional study of "official" law either of the past or of the present.

During the fifty years which have passed since the first edition of Petrzhitsky's *Theory of Law and State*, the scientific study of human behavior, as well as of various processes of social life, has made an essential progress. The new development of psychology, especially social psychology, and sociology does not contradict Petrzhitsky's doctrine. On the contrary, it is possible to develop it with the aid of this new knowledge, adapting it to the new terminology and to the new achievements of the social sciences.

Petrzhitsky's theory may be useful, however, even in its original form, for moralists, educators, legislators, and politicians. He discussed many significant problems, such as the interaction between religion, morality, and law; the necessity of educating people in both legal and moral consciousness and in respect for both rights and duties; the social function of law and its development in connection with moral, social, and ideological changes; the eventual conflict of the legal consciousness of individuals and groups (intuitive law) with the coercive system of law established and supported by the state. His ideas might be applied by teachers of ethics, by political scientists, and by jurists, especially legislators.

The recent publication of Petrzhitsky's main works in English, even in their abbreviated form, must be welcomed, therefore, as a very valuable contribution.

¹⁸He published some articles on Marxism and Darwinism in Russian and Polish magazines explaining the one-sidedness of the first and the unfitness of the second for explaining the development of social phenomena. An outline of his own sociological theory appears in the concluding chapter of his *Theory of Law and State*.

The Russian Church Schism: Its Background and Repercussions

By SERGE A. ZENKOVSKY

DEACON Paul of Aleppo, a Christian Arab who accompanied his father, Marcarios, Patriarch of Antioch, on a journey to Muscovy, tells in his memoirs of Macarios' participation in a council of the Russian church in 1656. This council convened to condemn a rebellious Russian archpriest who refused to obey Nikon, Patriarch of Russia. "After the council"—on the Sunday after the Ascension, May 18—relates the Arab clergyman, "our master celebrated with Patriarch Nikon in the cathedral, where they anathematized the priest Following the liturgy the Patriarch of Antioch gave a sermon concerning the priest, through an interpreter, and likened him to Arius, archpriest in Alexandria — for this man was archpriest in Moscow. The Patriarch then excommunicated the Moscow archpriest together with all his followers, and the singers and clergy chanted against him thrice 'Anathema.' After the liturgy we went to dine with the Patriarch of Moscow."¹

The excommunicated archpriest was a certain Ivan Neronov, the most popular and ardent preacher of the Russian moral and religious revival in Nizhni-Novgorod and Moscow during the period 1630-1650. Neronov had rebelled against some ritualistic innovations introduced in the Russian Church by Patriarch Nikon, and remained the latter's adamant and implacable adversary. His excommunication was the first instance of the Church Council's condemnation of the supporters of the old rites, and led later to the formation of a schism within the

¹Pavel Alepsky, *Puteshestvie antiokhskogo patriarkha Makaria*, Moscow, 1897, IV, 178.

Russian church which undermined Russian cultural unity and resulted in an irreconcilable cleavage of Russian Orthodoxy which has lasted to the present time.

Prior to this rupture in the Church, the Muscovite state had succeeded in preserving a cultural and ideological harmony. Neither the heresy of the Judaizers during the reign of Ivan III nor occasional conversions to Protestantism and Catholicism in the time of Ivan IV and during the Times of Trouble seriously affected Russian spiritual unity. Understandably, because of her geographical situation, Russia did not participate in the European cultural evolution but formed her own national type of civilization. Muscovy, however, was not seeking isolation from Europe, and the first Russian autocrats did not shun dynastic ties with the West. Ivan III married Sophia Paleologue, a Catholic princess of Byzantine origin, educated in the Latin tradition. His son, Basil III—father of Ivan IV—chose for his wife Elena Glinsky, a Lithuanian princess whose uncle, Prince Michael Glinsky, was one of the most influential feudal lords of the Polish-Lithuanian condominium and a brilliant *condottieri* well known in Germany and Italy. Ivan IV once proposed to Lady Mary Hastings of England, while Boris Godunov planned the marriage of his daughter to a Danish prince. The politics of both Ivans and of Basil III reflected the prevailing European methods during the Renaissance, and their deeds, in fact, often smacked of the precepts of Machiavelli. The Livonian wars of Ivan III and Ivan IV were conducted with the purpose of establishing direct contact with the West. At that time numerous Europeans visited and lived in Russia; even among the *oprichniki* of Ivan IV could be found numerous Germans and other West Europeans. After the reign of Boris Godunov a great many European military specialists, mercenaries, merchants and physicians came to Moscow.² The False Dimitri, imbued with the Western culture of Poland, had been enthusiastically received by the Russian people, and after his accession successfully initiated measures aimed at the extension of Western culture to Russia. The assassination of this enigmatic impos-

²S. F. Platonov gives an excellent picture of Russian cultural relations with the West at that time in *Moskva i Zapad*, Berlin, 1926, pp. 12-81.

tor was due not to an outbreak of popular indignation at his policies and cultural innovations but to the conspiracy of the boyars, and to the tactlessness of the Poles who accompanied Dimitri's bride to Russia.

The Muscovites and the Russian government, however, ceased to accept foreigners tolerantly after the Times of Trouble, when Russian national feeling was aroused by Polish and Swedish interventions. The attempt of the Catholics to conquer Russia for Rome, the pillages of the Lithuanian and the Zaporozhie bands, the occupation of Moscow by the Poles, the outrages of the Russian sanctuaries, and the loss of the Western provinces—all constituted a threat to Russian independence. The sharpening of Russian national feeling led to an intensification of Muscovy's cultural alienation and to general xenophobia.

These tribulations of the Times of Trouble were accepted by devout Russians as a manifestation of the wrath of God, and there came about a renewal of religiosity.³ In the 1630's and 1640's a new and unique religious movement, that of the Zealots of Piety, came into being. The Zealots were people who had witnessed the massacres and the conflagrations of the Times of Trouble in their childhood and who were now seeking the rebirth of Orthodoxy. Their aims were a moral reformation of the clergy and the people, a liturgic revival, and renewed piety. They also preached Christian assistance to the needy and weak, whom they tried to protect from injustice. They wanted to permeate the life of the nation with the teachings of Christ, to realize the ideal of an Orthodox tsardom.⁴

At the core of this movement were representatives of the White Clergy, non-regular priests and archpriests. Their leader

³Almost all early seventeenth century Russian writers explained the calamities of the years 1605-1613 as the punishment of the Russian people by God for their sins. I. Timofeev, *Vremennik* (Moscow, 1951), p. 91; A. Palitsyn, *Skazanie* (Moscow, 1955), p. 101; other writers in *Russkaia Istoricheskaia Biblioteka* (St. Petersburg, 1891), XIII, 32, 216, 223-224, 532-533, 561, 860, etc.

⁴The main sources on the history of the movement of the Zealots of Piety are collected in *Materialy dlia istorii Raskola*, ed. by N. I. Subbotin, Moscow, 1874, vol. 1 ("The life of Neronov" and others). See also N. Kapterev, *Patriarkh Nikon i ego protivniki*, Moscow, 1887, pp. 102-161, and N. Borozdin, *Protopop Avvakum*, St. Petersburg, 1898, pp. 14-24.

was Archpriest Neronov, who later was anathematized and excommunicated by the Russian and Syrian Patriarchs in Moscow. The movement had the support of Tsar Alexis and his close advisers, the pious boyars Morozov and Rtishchev, as well as Archbishop Nikon, who later became Patriarch. The Zealots of Piety carried the words of the Gospel and the Church fathers, particularly St. John Chrysostom's, the protector of the persecuted and the poor, to the people, who responded to these Russian Savanarolas and followed them. These preachers did not hesitate to challenge the Patriarch and the bishops when they found the hierarchy lax.

A harmonious relationship between the government and the leaders of the Zealots of Piety existed until 1653, although certain bishops found the movement's passionate sermonizing disturbing and a threat to their authority. In 1652 Nikon became Patriarch. Together with stricter discipline in the church and the introduction of various measures meant to improve the moral condition of the population, Nikon sought to increase the influence of patriarchal power in Church and state affairs. This theocratic tendency had probably grown under the influence of Kievan monks who were invited to Moscow as translators and teachers, and of the Greek clergy, many of whom were educated in Rome, whose representatives were frequently sent to Russia to seek financial support for their church. From both the Kievan monks and the Greeks Nikon may have learned of the independent and influential position of the Italian and Polish Catholic hierarchy and the power of the Pope. Also, the example of Patriarch Philaret (1619-1633), a dominating personality and brilliant statesman who became co-ruler with Tsar Michael, Alexis' father, might have suggested the idea of ruling the Church autocratically and playing a stronger role in state affairs. But Nikon, the son of a Russian-Mordvinian peasant, overlooked the fact that Philaret's position was due primarily to the fact that he was the father of Tsar Michael, and that despite his unusual power Patriarch Philaret had always acted very cautiously in Church affairs, never undertaking any important decision without consulting the Church Council.

In early spring, 1653, Nikon decreed the first changes in the

ritual of the Church service and prescribed the use of three fingers instead of two in making the sign of the cross.⁵ This innovation, issued solely by the Patriarch himself with no accompanying explanation and without the consultation of the Church Assembly, met with the vigorous opposition of the Zealots of Piety as well as the disapproval of Tsar Alexis. Nikon did not immediately try to enforce the decree, but proceeded first to settle with the opposition.

Ivan Neronov was sent to the far north, Archpriest Avvakum was exiled to Siberia, and others were transferred to remote provincial towns. Thus free to act unhindered, Patriarch Nikon in 1654-56 carried through a number of innovations which brought the practices of the Muscovite Church closer to those of the Greek and other eastern Orthodox churches. The Church books, which contained discrepancies from the Greek versions, were corrected according to the Greek originals. The Muscovite church renounced the changes and subordinated itself in all details to the Greek standards accepted by the Eastern Patriarchs of Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem. Opposition—which had issued from the Zealots of Piety—was unbroken, however. Supporters of the Muscovite traditions in the capital, in the north and in Siberia, on the Volga, and on the Don, continued to defend in their writings the two-fingered sign of the cross and the old Muscovite church rites. At the same time they challenged the discriminatory authority of the Patriarch and became increasingly bitter in opposing him.

What were the real causes of this contention over the reforms? The Patriarch and the Tsar wanted to remove the discrepancies which had crept in over the centuries; they wanted to introduce a common Orthodox ritual. Opponents of reform regarded the Muscovite practices as an inseparable part of the Russian Orthodox way of life—as, indeed, sanctified by generations of Muscovite clerics, saints, and laymen. When in 1656 and again in 1667 the adherents to the old Muscovite traditions were finally excommunicated they asked, not unjustifiably,

⁵*Zhitie protopopa Avvakuma*, St. Petersburg, Academy of Sciences, 1916, p. 15.

"How can it be that the Muscovite saints, who crossed themselves with two fingers and sang 'Alleluia' in the old way, have erred and thus been anathematized?" In their view, as formulated by Spiridon Potemkin, the Muscovite Church was right and could never sin in word, customs or writings, for the Church was sacred and nothing in its practice and doctrine could be suppressed or altered.⁶ For these traditionalists, or as they are now called, Old Believers, a strict observance of doctrine and rite was a prerequisite for salvation and attainment of the Kingdom of God. Since the Kingdom of God could be reached through the permeation of life by Orthodox principles and by strict observance of the liturgy and rites, they regarded any modification of the church service as a sin which obstructed the way to salvation.

Furthermore, since the late fifteenth century the Russian people had been told, both by their own ideologists and by visiting Eastern patriarchs, that Muscovite Russia, the "Third Rome," was the sole remaining stronghold of the true faith in the world. Suddenly, it appeared that Russia was not the bearer of piety and the true faith but rather the guardian of foolish errors, for which they were now anathematized and excommunicated. For the Old Believers the Nikonian reform signified the disintegration of the Muscovite Church and the old way of life, the collapse of the state ideology of the Orthodox tsardom.

The Council of 1666-67 condemned not only the old Muscovite church books, rituals, and two-fingered sign of the cross, but also the *Stoglav*—the decisions of the Church Council of 1551, which had been Russian canonic law for a century and the symbol of pure Orthodoxy.⁷ Old Muscovy was dethroned, deprived of its halo and glory. The "Third Rome" was demolished not from without but from within, by its own hierarchs, the Ukrainian monks, and the Greek prelates.

It is not difficult to picture the despair felt by the faithful Russians. Were they to relinquish the old ideals by which they

⁶S. Smirnov, *Vnutrennie voprosy v istorii Raskola XVII v.*, St Petersburg, 1898, pp. 97-104.

⁷The Decisions of the Council of 1667, in *Dopolnenie k Aktam Istoricheskim*, St. Petersburg, 1853, V, 472, 478, 488.

and their fathers had lived, and accept damnation by submitting to the discriminative decision of the state power and the church hierarchy? It was a particularly difficult situation for those enthusiastic sermonizers who had but recently called the people to a spiritual rebirth, to increased veneration for the Church and the Muscovite Orthodox way of life. The majority of them could not accept the prescribed changes and found themselves in opposition to the Church and State.

Here, then, the question might be asked, why did the Church and the Muscovite ruling elite embark upon a path of reform which could lead only to the creation of a profound conflict in the hearts of the Russian people? The reasons were not only religious, but also political and personal. There was no real necessity for the Church's denial of Muscovite religious traditions. True, the requirements of printing demanded conformity of text in the Church books and the elimination of contradictions or errors; but Nikon's peremptoriness in initiating these changes was extreme. He issued his first directives upon the advice of the Greek and Ukrainian monks and bishops, while, at the same time, his measures were not condoned by the Patriarch of Constantinople, who wrote him that every local church could have its particular customs, provided only that it preserve the purity of Orthodox teaching and the fundamental dogmatic truths.⁸

The Councils of 1666-1667 were inspired beyond merely correcting books and rites. These Councils, as well as that of 1682, undertook a substantial reorganization of Church life, and, contrary to centuries-old tradition, control over parochial life was tightened. New bishoprics were created and the parishes, formerly democratic in structure, were deprived of independence. The election of priests was replaced by their nomination by the bishops.⁹ Where the Zealots of Piety had sought to reinforce the influence of priests among the parishioners, the Church and state now aimed at destroying the independence of

⁸The text of the letter of Patriarch Paisios in *Khristianskoe chtenie*, 1881, I, 313, 539.

⁹S. Iushkov, *Ocherki po istorii prikhodskoi zhizni na severe Rossii*, XVI-XVII v., St. Petersburg, 1913, 129-130; M. Bogoslovsky, *Zemskoe samoupravlenie na russkom severe v XVII v.*, Moscow, 1912, II, 44-46.

the local religious communities. Thus, the decisions of the Councils paved the way for the future reforms of Peter I, who placed Church life entirely under the tutelage of the state.

Considerations of foreign policy played no less important a role in the state's acceptance of Patriarch Nikon's reforms. In the 1650's, recovering from the Times of Trouble, Moscow renewed its political interest in Poland, the Ukraine, and Turkey. The government, alarmed by the appeals of the Cossacks and the South-Western Russian clergy, decided to initiate the unification of those Russian territories which had been annexed to Lithuania and Poland during the centuries of the Tartar yoke. As early as 1624 Isaaky Borisevich, Bishop of Lutsk, apparently representing Metropolitan Iov Boretsky of Kiev, had come to Moscow to persuade the Tsar to liberate the southern and western territories from the oppression of the Poles. In 1632 the Ukrainian Cossacks had met with Bishop Jonas Konissky in the city of Korsun and resolved to request Tsar Michael to accept them as his subjects if the Poles continued their persecution.¹⁰ From the very beginning of the rebellion of the Cossack leader Khmel'nitsky against the Poles, petitions to the Tsar for help came more and more frequently from the Russian Orthodox population of the Polish and Lithuanian territories. Khmel'nitsky and the Ukrainian Cossacks asked the Muscovite government to incorporate the Ukraine into its realm, but under the pressure of conservative elements this action was postponed by the Muscovite Land Assembly until 1653, when Polish successes in the Ukraine seemed to endanger the very existence of Orthodoxy. The reunification of all the former lands of the late Rurik dynasty, those Russian territories which had been a part of the domain of the Grand Duke of Kiev, became the primary concern in the Muscovite policy with the reign of Ivan III.

With Muscovite Russia's decision to intervene in the civil war in the Ukraine, a new political perspective came to the view of tsarist statesmen. The reunification of all the Ukrainian territories with Russia would bring the new Russian borders

¹⁰K. V. Kharlampovich, *Malorossiiskoe vlianie na velikorusskuiu tserkovnuiu zhizn*, Kazan, 1914, p. 26.

closer to the Orthodox population of the Balkans, the former territories of the Byzantine Empire. The possibility of new contacts with the Orthodox world of the Near East kindled hope for the liberation of the ancient Imperial city of Constantinople from Moslem rule. This hope was expressed by Tsar Alexis to Greek merchants residing in Moscow in 1656,¹¹ and it was reflected in verses written by Simon Polotsky, the ideologist of the Muscovite government and the court poet to Tsar Alexis, on the occasion of the birth of Peter I:

The month of May brings us new hopes
Since the Tsarevich Peter was born.
Yesterday Constantinople was taken by Turks,
Yet its liberation appears imminent.
The deliverer is here and intends to revenge;
The Imperial city will soon be freed.
O enjoy this news, City of Constantinople,
And thou, Holy Sophia, hast bright prospects—
An Orthodox prince has been born,
The Great Duke Peter of Muscovy.¹²

During these years the famous "Greek Project," which took final shape under Catherine II, was initiated. The Russian Tsar was envisioned as the protector of the entire Orthodox world. It should be pointed out, however, that the initiative for this grandiose Near Eastern project belonged not to the Muscovites but to the Greeks. As early as 1590 the Ecumenical Patriarch Jeremiah had expressed the hope that "all pious lands will be united under the Tsar, and you [the Tsar] will be the only true Christian monarch of the universe."¹³ The continuous pilgrimage of Near Eastern patriarchs to Muscovy and their acceptance of the Tsar's protection and political guidance only strengthened the conviction of Nikon and Tsar Alexis that the time had come for Russia to play a decisive role in the Orthodox world, and thus the reforms of Patriarch Nikon coincided with the activation of Muscovite policies in southern Russia.

¹¹Pavel Aleppsky, *op. cit.*, IV, 170-171.

¹²N.K. Gudzy, *Istoriia drevnei russkoi literatury*, Moscow, 1953, p. 463.

¹³Patriarch Jeremiah's address to Patriarch Job, Makarii, *Istoriia russkoi tserkvi*, Moscow, 1902, X, 40.

The reunion of the Ukraine and White Russia with Muscovy and the plans for the eventual unification of all Orthodox peoples under the aegis of the Russian Tsar required the unification of Orthodox practices and the adaptation by the Russian church of the ritual and the customs common to Greek-Orthodox tradition, which had been introduced in the Ukraine in the mid-seventeenth century.¹⁴ The innovations of Patriarch Nikon in 1653, which were actually an introduction of the Greek ecclesiastical pattern in Russia, almost coincided with the Ukrainian Cossack Assembly in Pereyaslav, which decided to accept the suzerainty of the Russian Tsar. Once the decision to readjust Russian Orthodox to the Greek pattern was taken, the Muscovite statesmen, on the advice of the Greeks,¹⁵ proceeded to disavow the essence of "ancient Russian tradition," the exclusiveness of Muscovy's mission as guardian of the "true Christian faith" and bearer of the idea of a Christian state, as well as local Great Russian nationalism.

In these fateful years of the 1650's and 1660's Moscow relinquished its traditional ideology and ceased to be a purely Great Russian state, in order to become an All-Russian Empire. The Tsar and his advisers repudiated the policy of Muscovite cultural and religious isolation, the 200-year old tradition of Russia's exclusive historical mission, and the messianic theory of the Third Rome. For the sake of imperial expansion as well as intellectual and technical cooperation with the outside world, the Russian government decided to abandon its old myths and beliefs and with them the entire pattern of the indigenous Muscovite civilization. The Grand Duke and Sovereign of Muscovy became Tsar of Great, Little and White Russia, a title which clearly indicates a transition toward imperial goals. Half a century later Peter I was officially crowned as Emperor.

The change from the old Muscovite to the new "All-Russian" cultural patterns occurred with astonishing rapidity—a sign, per-

¹⁴Metropolitan Peter Moghila conducted a church reform in the Ukraine in the 1640's similar to that of Nikon. See N. Kapterev, "Reformy Nikona," *Bogoslovskii Vestnik* (1908), III, 249.

¹⁵N. Kapterev, "Postanovleniia Sobora 1667," in *Bogoslovskii Vestnik* (1908), III, 296; G. Florovsky, *Puti Russkogo Bogosloviia*, Paris, 1937, p. 67.

haps, that the old traditions no longer corresponded to the needs of an expanding, new, powerful state. Almost overnight monks from Kiev and Polotsk replaced the former Muscovite cultural leaders. The old Muscovite missal was re-edited by Kievan monks, and the Polish-educated White Russian monk, Simon Polotsky, became the recognized state ideologist and educator of the Tsar's children. Kievan choirboys replaced the Muscovite singers in the Tsar's and the Patriarch's churches, and the Tsar organized a Western-style theatre in his formerly pious palace. Soon Ukrainian bishops invaded Moscow, introducing their Catholic and Protestant "heretical" teachings and replacing the Great Russian hierarchs; even the Muscovite literary and Church language underwent the influence of the Kievan dialect.¹⁶ Tsar Alexis' son, Peter the Great, less than half a century after the beginning of the reform, would follow his father's policies closely, order the beards and long coats of the boyars to be cut, conquer the Baltic, and strengthen the army. The odor of tobacco would replace that of incense in the Tsar's palace, and the nobility would soon not only become secularized but would completely forget their bearded and pious ancestors.

However, neither the decisions of the seventeenth-century Councils nor the ensuing persecution by the state broke the supporters of the Old Faith, and their newly-found leaders. Among the opponents to the state's new policies were not only mere obscurantists and enemies of enlightenment, but also the majority of traditional Muscovites, the main part of its "intelligentsia," and its recent spiritual elite. While the court, officers, and some of the landed gentry supported the reforms, a part of the aristocracy also opposed the new order. Great Russian intellectual opposition to Westernization and their refusal to bow to the new "general line" was so unanimous that for three-quarters of a century, from 1660 to 1735, almost no Great Russian names appear on a list of the writers, educators, and theologians of the official "governmental" cultural school. This is a phenomenon which has been overlooked by historians, but

¹⁶R. Jakobson, "The Kernel of Comparative Slavic Studies," *Harvard Slavic Studies*, 1953, I, 50, 58-59.

nevertheless it remains undeniable that among the cultural leaders of Imperial Russia in the late seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries there were very few Great Russians.

Until 1702, the year of the death of Adrian, the last Patriarch, the Church still remained in the hands of the Muscovites. With the exception, however, of Sylvester Medvedev and the monk Eutymios, there were no outstanding personalities in its ranks, and even these two men did not play roles of any importance in the further evolution of Church and State. From the beginning of the eighteenth century, the hierarchy of the young Empire's church leadership consisted primarily of Ukrainians. The state did not accept Great Russians into the higher administration of the church, suspecting them of sympathy with the Old Believers, while the Old Believers themselves avoided joining the "Nikonian," established Church clergy. In 1722 there were five Ukrainians and four Great Russians in the Holy Synod; by 1725 there were two Great Russians and five Ukrainians; and by 1751, nine Ukrainian bishops and one Great Russian priest.¹⁷ The same predominance of Little Russians could be observed in the seminaries, in the ranks of provincial bishops, and among the court clergy. The former Muscovite elite was no longer represented even in the Church hierarchy.

A similar situation existed in the schools and in literature. Textbooks of Russian literature mention no Great Russian names between the death of Alexis and the reign of Anna, and until the time of Sumarokov in the 1750's only two Great Russian names of importance stand out—Lomonosov and Tretiakovsky. Even Pososhkov and Tatishchev remained unknown to their contemporaries, their works being published only many years after their death.

Of those names well known in Russian literature of the early imperial period, such as Simon Polotsky, Feofan Prokopovich (the main ideologist under Peter the Great), Stefan Yavorsky, Dimitri Tuptallo (bishop of Rostov), Kantemir, Mons, and Puass—all were of Little or White Russian, Moldavian, or German origin. Long before them the Kievan monks Epiphany Slavenetsky, Damaskin Ptitsky, and Arseny Satanovsky had

¹⁷Kharlampovich, *op. cit.*, pp. 471, 472, 485, and 486.

begun to introduce stylistic and linguistic novelties in Muscovite writings.

It is not surprising that the privileged position of west Russians (Ukrainians and White Russians) and foreigners in fields of cultural endeavor and the church administration irritated the Muscovites. Their exclusion from the cultural and spiritual leadership of the land during the early decades of Westernization—which had already begun under Tsar Alexis—led to antagonism between the old and new citizens of the empire and strengthened the Muscovites' hostility toward Westernization. It was not fear of novelty but rather offense at the defamation of ancient traditions and repudiation of the Old Russian ideology which brought about opposition to cultural reform and to the new policies of the Empire.

Imperial Russian policy toward the populations of the newly incorporated territories was crowned by a long-lasting success. Little Russia, today's Ukraine, found a field of endeavor for its intelligentsia. Career opportunities greatly facilitated the ideological integration of the Empire's new subjects, for the state rejected Great Russian nationalism for the sake of the imperial idea. Feofan Prokopovich, the closest collaborator of Peter the Great in the field of cultural reform, and a Ukrainian by birth and education, wrote, "In our fatherland we can now observe differences in clothes, houses and names, but there is no discrimination before the law; all are equal." It was Prokopovich who, in his sermons, created and popularized the word "*Rossianin*" (imperial Russian), and there is little doubt that his grief at the death of Peter the Great was genuine, for Peter had created a genuinely multi-national empire. Many "imperial Russians" from Kiev or Poltava were attracted by the growth of this empire, and even the tumultuous Cossack leaders forgot their dreams of independence and served the Tsars faithfully, particularly upon receiving privileges of nobility and the right to introduce serfdom on their estates. For two hundred years—from Mazepa to Petliura—the Ukraine remained the most tranquil part of the empire. The agrarian disturbances there in the

nineteenth and twentieth centuries were directed against local landlords, not against the integrity of the nation.

The political and intellectual integration of the leading strata of other recently acquired territories proceeded with the same rapidity. The Baltic barons rushed with the greatest joy to Petersburg, and for a period in the 1730's even dominated the Russian court and Russian policies. Later, Georgians, Armenians, Poles, and Tartars also appeared at court and in the higher administration posts. The names of Razumovsky, Bezborodko, Rodzianko, Skoropadsky, Loris-Melikov, and Kutaisov, Czartorysti and Wielopolski, Tsitsianov and Bagration, Khan Nakhi-chevansky, and Mahmendarov all point up to the success of the imperial idea during the first two centuries of the Empire's existence. Later, in the Duma period, the Russian and non-Russian intelligentsias collaborated in a most friendly way.

Thus, while the Empire was expanding and integrating its new citizens, a part of the Great Russian, former Muscovite, population remained in opposition to the cultural and political activities of the state and became increasingly isolated from it. The traditionalists refused to cooperate with the Empire, and the state, for its part, eliminated them from the political and cultural mainstream of the nation's life. For two centuries these nonconformist communities lived apart from the Westernized body of the nation. At best their churches were merely tolerated, for they were not officially recognized by the tsarist government until 1906, and their preachers were arrested or exiled. Persecuted for their religious nonconformity, these traditionalists, faithful to their beliefs and traditions of their Great Russian ancestors, lived in a state of internal emigration and created their own cultural world in which life was neither Westernized nor secularized but patterned after the old Muscovite ways. In their independent communities the Old Believers preserved the ancient customs, ideology, and family structure.¹⁸

¹⁸See this writer's forthcoming article, "The Ideological World of the Denisov Brothers" in *Harvard Slavic Studies*, Cambridge, Mass., vol. III.

Their preachers exalted the virtues of the purest Orthodoxy, their writers defended the principles of their faith, cautioning them against the dangers of secular and cosmopolitan culture. Many were executed during the first century of the schism; thousands died in prison or in exile, and tens of thousands preferred to immolate themselves in the fires of the Self-Burners rather than submit to the schismatic state. The publication of their books was prohibited by the tsarist authorities, who sought to preserve Westernized society and culture from the poison of old Muscovite thought and traditionalist literature. It seems incredible now that the most brilliant writer of Muscovite origin, the Archpriest Avvakum, an unexcelled master of the Russian colloquial tongue and creator of an artistic Russian prose more than a century before Karamzin, remained totally unknown to Westernized Russians until the 1850's. The *Encyclopedia of Brokhaus and Efron*, a standard pre-revolutionary Russian work, ignores Avvakum as a writer and devotes fewer lines to him than to a forgotten Algerian rebel, Abd-el Kader.

Avvakum was not the only outstanding writer among the Old Believers. Epiphany, Deacon Theodore, Avraamy, the Denisov brothers, Ivan Filipov, and many others were the representatives of Great Russian literature during the time of cultural upheaval from 1660 to 1735, while successive generations of Old Believers in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries produced others. Their works, however, were not better known to the Westernized landlord, enlightened courtier and early intellectuals than are the works of such present-day émigré Russian writers as Nabokov, Berdiaev, or Bulgakov known to Soviet readers.

Despite persecution, however, the Old Belief spread. Thousands, at times tens of thousands, of Great Russians were converted to the Old Faith by its missionaries. N. Melnikov, a tsarist official responsible for carrying out the government's policies toward the Old Believers and himself a specialist in the history of the *Raskol*, considered that in the 1860's over one-quarter of the Great Russian people belonged to the Old Faith—about one-sixth of the total Orthodox population of Rus-

sia.¹⁹ Other investigators in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries believed that as much as one-third of the Great Russian population still adhered to the old rites and thought.²⁰ Melnikov, in a report to the Minister of the Interior in 1857, bluntly stated that if the persecution were to cease and the Old Faith were to be officially recognized, the entire Great Russian population would probably revert to the Old Belief.²¹

As is frequently true of religious minorities, the Old Believers demonstrated their spiritual and social vitality. Most researchers investigating the history and evolution of the *Raskol* have agreed that the Old Believers were stronger economically than the rest of the non-Westernized population and that literacy among them was greater than among supporters of the established church. The Old Believers' discussions of theological and ritualistic problems of dogma served them as a kind of mental discipline, while persecution hardened their character, enabling them to persist in the preservation of their national traits and traditions. Toward the end of his career Melnikov wrote, surprisingly, that in his opinion the spiritual revival of Russia would be possible only on the basis of the Old Believers' mode of life and way of thinking. He added, however, that this evolution

¹⁹P. I. Melnikov, in *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, Moscow, 1896, XIV, 380, estimates that the total number of Old Believers by 1860 was 10.3 million. K. P. Pobedonostsev also refers in his correspondence to the rapid growth of the number of Old Believers: see V. Markov, *K istorii raskola vo vtoroi polovine XIX v.*, Moscow, 1912, pp. 241, 247.

²⁰V. Prugavin: *Staroobriadchestvo XIX v.*, Moscow, 1904, p. 11, (14.5-15 million); *Statisticheskie Tablitsy*, Ts. St. Up., MVD, St. Petersburg, 1863, p. 235 ff; *Russkaia Rech*, 1881, p. 75.

²¹"We may consider that in the twentieth century all Great Russians, except the nobility and clergy, will already have become Old Believers." Melnikov (Note, 1857), *op. cit.*, I, 174.

would occur only after the *Raskolniki* joined the mother church and ceased to be schismatics.²²

Propagation of the Old Faith was especially successful in the borderlands of the Empire, where the state's control had always been looser than in the central region. That part of northern Russia between the Volga and the White Sea—where local self-government and free parochial organization were preserved till the beginning of the eighteenth century—was the first stronghold of the Old Believers. In the forests were hundreds of Old Believer hermitages and monasteries, from which the fanatic and tenacious preachers carried their teachings to all parts of Russia. Siberia, parts of the Don, and the lands of the Ural and Terek Cossacks—regions inhabited by independent and energetic people who had escaped serfdom and the state's strict regulation—became predominantly non-conformist quite early. In the latter half of the eighteenth century, when Catherine II reduced persecution of the Old Believers, the latter began to move from the country and forests to the cities, where they became tradesmen and industrialists. In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries the Rogozhsky and Preobrazhensky communities of dissenters in Moscow controlled the largest concentrations of capital in Russia, and such Old Believer bourgeois families at Morozov, Riabushinsky, Guchkov, Soldatenkov, Prokhorov, Kokorev and others played leading roles in the economic evolution of nineteenth-century Russia.²³ In the 1830's and 1840's, alarmed at the rapid extension of Old Believer teachings and growth of their economic power, the government renewed its persecution. By 1853, on the eve of the Crimean war, all Old Believer centers and monasteries were closed. The

²²"The renovation of the Russian spirit will evolve only on the basis of the Old Believers' movement." Melnikov (letter, 1866), *op. cit.*, I, 258. His opinion was supported later in an article by the Imperial State Comptroller, T. I. Filipov, in *Grazhdanin*, 1882, No. 17.

²³P. G. Ryndziunsky, "Staroobriadcheskaia organizatsiia," *Voprosy istorii religii i ateizma*, Moscow, 1950, pp. 203, 218, and 226; and P. Buryshkin, *Moskva Kupecheskaia*, New York, 1954, pp. 119, 144, 151, 177, and 189, etc.; V. Tschebotarieff-Bill, "The Morozovs," *Russian Review*, 1955, XIV, No. 3.

priests were exiled, their books and ancient, often priceless, ikons were deposited in government warehouses or burned. While Catholics, Protestants, Moslems, and Jews in the Russian Empire were accepted as legal religious bodies by the state, the Old Believers—the representatives of Muscovy—were denied recognition as an organized religious community. At the end of the nineteenth century, for instance, the Moslems in Russia, whose number was probably close to that of the Old Believers, had 25,000 parochial and private schools,²⁴ while the Old Believers, the most Russian of Russians, officially had none. They remained without bishops until the end of the 1840's, and when, with the help of a retired Greek metropolitan, they succeeded in organizing their hierarchy, the administration refused to legalize its existence.

After the death of Nicholas I persecution diminished under the liberal government of Alexander II. A decree of 1863 granted the Old Believers some civil and economic privileges, and in 1874 another decree permitted them to register their marriages with the police. Finally, in 1883, the Old Believers were granted most civil rights, including the right to obtain identification papers and to change professions on the same bases as members of other denominations. Still, they were strongly limited in admission to government service, the army, and educational institutions. During the Russo-Japanese war the Old Believer archbishop of Nizhni Novgorod was drafted as a private and sent to the front, while the clergy of all other confessions was exempt from compulsory military service. In 1905, of the 174 Old Believer communities in the region of Nizhni Novgorod, only twelve were registered and officially recognized by the government.²⁵ The final granting of all civil rights, which put the Old Believers on an equal footing with other confessions, came with the act of religious tolerance of April 17, 1906. For the next eleven years Russian Old Believers

²⁴VAKT (Tatar newspaper in Orenburg) September, 1912, #1044 quoted in *Mir Islama*, 1912, II, 615.

²⁵S. Melgunov, *Staroobriadcheskie i sektantskie obshchiny*, Moscow, 1907, pp. 4-5.

could congregate freely, open schools, print their books, and organize congresses. It was a shortlived period of revival. In 1917 came a new era of trial.

These were the conditions in which the most conservative and traditional part of the Great Russian population lived and developed. Economically they were probably the most prosperous segment of the Great Russian people, and probably the staunchest morally and psychologically, with strong family ties, well-organized communities, and a spirit of active mutual aid. Yet persecution prevented these substantial and conservative citizens from sympathizing with the tsarist government and its policies. Forced isolation, restrictions, offences against their beliefs and the periodic curtailment of their economic activity under threat of confiscation resulted in the alienation of this traditionalist group from the politics of the Empire, and helped cause the split of Russian conservative forces into two irreconcilable sectors. In one group were the Westernized pro-government bureaucracy and nobility, which throughout the last two reigns were strong neither culturally nor economically. After the emancipation of the serfs in 1861 the nobility rapidly lost its wealth, and with it its influence, while the steadily growing and ambitious intelligentsia gradually dislodged it from the role of cultural leadership of the Empire. In the other sector were the traditionalist peasants, tradesmen, and industrialists who underwent Westernization to a much lesser degree than the upper classes. Among these, the Old Believers constituted the most cohesive and dynamic element. But in view of tsarist policies toward them, they could hardly be supporters of anything but a more tolerant and liberal policy on the part of the government. In many respects their attitude was similar to the oppositional attitude of the Catholic minority in the German Reich during Bismark's rule, in the era of *Kulturkampf*. After

many years of opposition, the German Catholics also slipped to the left, and their party, "the Center," became a solid pillar of the Weimar Republic. Likewise, the French Huguenots, strongly traditional socially and economically, after two centuries of persecution supported liberal political parties.

Thus, the Old Believers' political oppositionalism, rooted in the North Russian democratic tradition and intensified by two centuries of persecution, conflicted with the political conservatism of the government and nobility. In the 1840's one of the pillars of the Orthodox Church, the brilliant Metropolitan Philaret of Moscow, proclaimed that in spite of the Old Believers' religious traditionalism, their democratic and social nature was incompatible with the ideological basis upon which the Russian imperial system was founded.²⁶ A quarter of a century later K. Pobedonostsev, the notorious adviser to Emperor Alexander II and supervisor of ecclesiastic affairs, maintained that the *Raskolniki* were more dangerous than the revolutionaries.²⁷ In the early twentieth century there were, at the head of the liberal bourgeoisie, such leading Muscovite bankers and industrialists as Riabushinsky, Konovalov, Morozov, and Guchkov — all of whom were of Old Believer descent.²⁸

In the local government, in the Zemstvos and municipalities, in the Duma, and in political congresses, the traditionalist groups of northern, central and eastern Russia usually sided with the liberals rather than with the rightists, and at times even with the leftists. In the first and second Dumas many Old Believer

²⁶N. Belikov, *Deiatelnost metropolita Filareta*, Kazan, 1896, pp. 16-17, 359.

²⁷See correspondence of H. Pobedonostsev with N. Subbotin in V. Markov, pp. 12-13, 16-17.

²⁸Buryshkin, pp. 291, 289, 297, 303.

deputies—peasants and workers from the Volga, northern Russia, the Urals or Siberia, joined the Labor Group, while the traditionalist peasantry was at times Socialist Revolutionary. The rich Old Believer bourgeoisie was usually in the "October" group or among the Cadets, and they embraced the reforms and constitution of 1905. For them the parliament was perpetuating the tradition of the Zemskii Sobor, the old Muscovite land assembly. On the eve of the revolution the ancient democratic tradition of the old republics of Novgorod, Pskov, and Viatka remained dear to many of them. A few Old Believer millionaires even gave financial support to the radical revolutionary movement.

For many years the last emperor, Nicholas II, believed that the bulk of the non-Westernized Russian people, the Great Russian peasantry and merchants, were supporters of the throne and were opposed to the radical Westernized intelligentsia. The centuries-long persecution of the Old Faith, however, could hardly have developed strong sympathies for the regime among these born traditionalists. The seventeenth-century schism, religious conflicts, and subsequent Westernization split the possible supporters of the monarchy into Westernized conservatives and traditionalist opposition. This split was never overcome, and proved fatal for the monarchy.

Hence, in the decisive years of struggle between the two Westernized opponents—the revolutionary radicals and the monarchy—the traditionalists were not on the side of the throne. Whereas in the seventeenth century the Russian peasantry and bourgeoisie had sought to preserve the Muscovite tsardom, their twentieth-century successors were cool toward the fate of Imperial Petersburg, and remained a silent and impassive witness to the Russian drama. The Westernized empire fell

without finding support among the most traditional section of the Great Russian people, and the Romanov dynasty was denied even its Vendée.²⁰

²⁰Nowhere in Russia, neither in the Cossack regions of the Don, Kuban, Terek, and the Urals, nor in Siberia and the Maritime provinces, where large groups of the local population participated in the anti-Communist struggle, was the movement monarchist. The Russian counter-revolution, or, better to say, the anti-Communist movement, never became a Russian Vendée or Bretagne.

S. A. Koussevitzky

By MARK WEINBAUM

DISTINGUISHED personalities are often eccentric. The late Sergei Alexandrovich Koussevitzky once confided to me that in his spare time he used to write musico-philosophical treatises "for myself only."

When I wondered why he did not show those treatises to others, or have them published, he smiled enigmatically and repeated "they are only for myself."

Yet, that may not have been an eccentricity at all. Every phase of Koussevitzky's musical activity was in the open: an orchestra conductor must always demonstrate his achievements to the public, he must face criticism whether fair or unfair. Small wonder that an extremely sensitive person like Koussevitzky would have wanted to do something which he did not have to share with others. Hence the secrecy of his musico-philosophical treatises.

Inscrutable are the secrets of art. Why did Germany, pre-Hitler and pre-Bismarck Germany, give the world the greatest creators of music? Why did Russian genius find its most brilliant expression in literature? How did it happen that a man like Shakespeare was born to ostensibly ordinary parents in a small English town, Stratford-on-Avon?

To such questions and similar ones there are, of course, ready answers and explanations. But they are seldom satisfactory. There must be some inexplicable secret in the birth of a genius and in the development of his creative powers, something which is beyond our comprehension.

What, for instance, was there in the air of Vyshni Volochek, a town in Central Russia, where Koussevitzky was born on July 26, 1874? Or what was there in the blood of his parents that made him so susceptible to music, and gave him so much energy to overcome the numerous and seemingly unsurmountable obstacles on the road toward the fulfillment of his destiny?

Much has been written about Koussevitzky. Much more, however, remains to be said, especially about his early formative years.

Once, when Sergei Alexandrovich presented me with his biography by Arthur Lurie, the composer, I told him that I had read the book and found it interesting but at the same time disappointing. It contained a great deal about pre-revolutionary musical life in Russia but scanty biographical data about Koussevitzky, the man.

"You are right," he remarked, "Lurie did not even mention that I was born into an Orthodox Jewish family. I am proud to belong to the Jewish race just as I am proud of having been brought under the influence of great Russian culture. It is from my parents that I have inherited my musical abilities; my father played the violin, my mother the piano. As for my love for art, that I eagerly absorbed from Russian literature. In my early youth I used to read as avidly as a drunkard swallows vodka."

Books opened to the little boy a big and wonderful world far beyond the horizon of Vyshni Volochek. His mother died when he was three years old. His father, struggling hopelessly against poverty, later left the child to shift for himself.

Already in his early youth the boy developed a passionate love for music and musical instruments. When wandering musicians happened to come to town, he would follow them about wherever they went, learning to play their instruments. His father disapproved. He did not want his son to become a struggling musician like himself, and he tried to discourage him. But fate willed it otherwise. At the age of eight Seryozha made friends with a little girl whose widowed mother, Maria Ropenberg, was a well-educated woman and a good pianist, a pupil of Nickolai Rubenstein. She was impressed by Seryozha's love for music and undertook to teach him. She introduced him to the world of great music, and gave him the rudiments of a musical education.

At the age of twelve the enterprising young man was already conducting a small orchestra at the local theater. At fourteen he decided to go to Moscow to continue his musical education

and had hopes of becoming a great musician. With a bundle of his personal belongings and three rubles in his pocket the boy left his father's home without letting anybody into his secret.

That step was characteristic of Koussevitzky's entire life. Once he made a decision he would stick to it persistently, even obstinately, and no obstacle was too great for him when it came to carrying out his plans.

Koussevitzky arrived in Moscow in the fall of 1888. He immediately went to the Conservatory of Music.

"You are too late," he was told, "the examinations are over, and we have no vacancies."

The same happened at the Philharmonic School. "You will have to wait until next year," they told him.

Seryozha became hysterical: "I cannot . . . I will not wait . . . I want to study . . . I won't leave . . . you will not dare to put me out . . . You must help me."

The director, Shestakovsky, a kind-hearted man, had great difficulty in quieting him down. The boy was examined and placed in the double bass class. It was tuition-free and offered a small stipend as well.

Thus Koussevitzky became a double bass player. As this instrument held little promise for a talented and ambitious student, it looked as though he was destined to become an orchestra player, with little hope for anything better. Yet within ten years the talented youth became a double bass virtuoso whose solo concerts captivated all Europe.

This, however, was only the beginning. Sergei Alexandrovich did not forget the dreams of his youth, nor would he give them up. More than ever before he wanted to become a conductor and have an orchestra of his own. During his travels in Europe he had an opportunity to observe famous conductors. He met, and enjoyed the company of Nikisch, Strauss, Debussy, Scriabin, and many others. His debut as a conductor eventually took place in Berlin. Then there followed concerts in Vienna, Paris, London. The reviews were favorable. He returned to Russia an acknowledged orchestra leader.

In 1901 Koussevitzky married Natalia Konstantinovna Oushkova. Her father, a prominent and very rich merchant, liked his son-in-law and readily financed his various musical enterprises. Sergei Alexandrovich said to me once: "My father-in-law used to say, 'Sergei, here is my pocket, help yourself to the money in it as much as you wish'."

Koussevitzky did not hesitate to do just that. He formed a symphony orchestra of his own. He established a music publishing house which published compositions by Rachmaninoff, Scriabin, Stravinsky, and Medtner. He organized chamber music concerts and great musical festivals: a Beethoven cycle in 1911, a Tchaikovsky cycle in 1912, and a Bach cycle in 1913.

Sergei Alexandrovich toured Southern Russia and the Volga region with his orchestra. He gave concerts in towns never before visited by a symphony orchestra. He invited foreign conductors, composers, and soloists. He worked with a kind of impetuous fervor as if he felt that his time was short and he had to hurry on. Even the First World War did not stop his activity, it only slowed it down. But then came the Revolution, and soon thereafter the Communist dictatorship.

The Koussevitzkys left Russia in 1920, for a short time, they believed, until things settled down. Little did they know that it was to be forever, that America was to become their home, and that Koussevitzky was destined to see the realization of many of his dreams in the United States.

From 1920 to 1923 Koussevitzky conducted in the capitals and big cities of Europe. He introduced to European audiences music by Russian composers as well as modern compositions in general. Especially famous were his autumn and spring series of concerts in Paris.

The late Olin Downes of the *New York Times* gave a vivid description of Koussevitzky, "the conductor of the hour in Paris" who had already been invited to come to America. "On the conductor's stand," wrote Downes, "he is a figure to watch as well as to hear. Tall, with dark hair which is graying, with nervous hands and a face which sensitively reflects his mood, and with a degree of bodily command that few conductors

possess, Koussevitzky plays, obviously but not the less effectively, on the orchestra.

And a little further: "With a chorus . . . and with an orchestra which Mr. Koussevitzky will not prefer to the Boston Symphony, he secured the most expressive and, at times, volcanic responses to his wishes. And at such times the conductor was a figure to remember — erect, imperious, his face working with his emotions; a hand of which the fingers themselves are eloquent, suddenly bringing out an outburst of tone from the chorus; a glance which, sweeping over the orchestra, brings sudden and dramatic results. As a musician he is evidently endowed with a temperament that can on occasion sweep everything before it. There is an authority, a quenchless enthusiasm and a big sweep in all that he does, which, if he were less sincere and individual as a musician than he is, would be a compelling force for a public success."

Despite his success Koussevitzky was not happy in Europe. "After Russia," he remarked to me once, "I had a feeling I was suffocating there." America was different. Her vastness reminded him of Russia. He readily accepted the offer to become conductor of the Boston Symphony.

Sergei Alexandrovich arrived in Boston in 1924. That year opened a new and probably the most important chapter of his life and musical activity.

I remember my surprise when I first met him in 1940. He is old, I thought, he is a very tired old man, much older than his sixty-six years. But what a change took place the moment he began to talk about music, art in general, and his future plans. His eyes sparkled. His face lost all traces of age and fatigue. He spoke with youthful vigor and captivating eagerness.

"The Boston Symphony," Sergei Alexandrovich told me then, "was one of the best when Arthur Nikisch and Karl Muck were its conductors. After them the orchestra deteriorated, and later it was crippled by a strike. Two weeks after my arrival in Boston I came to the conclusion that the orchestra was in need of important changes. Without them, I felt, it was impossible for me to go on. I put the matter before the Board of Directors.

Your orchestra is dead, I told them, and I won't remain with it unless you grant me complete freedom of action."

Koussevitzky told them that he wanted to eliminate second-rate musicians, pension off old ones, and restore discipline among the rest. "And where," they asked, "will you get new musicians?" "In Europe," he replied.

For some time the directors hesitated. The orchestra members had numerous friends and relatives in Boston. Their loss of employment would be resented. There would be talk of the conductor, himself a foreigner, preferring foreigners to Americans. But Koussevitzky was adamant, and the directors gave in.

"I went to Europe," continued Sergei Alexandrovich, "and engaged twenty-seven musicians the first year, and thirty-six the next. From France I brought the best strings, from Germany the best winds."

Of course, there were numerous protests. There were assertions that the whole thing was quite unnecessary, that the conductor was merely surrounding himself with his old friends from Europe, especially from Russia. But gradually such talk died down; criticism changed to expressions of satisfaction and pride. The orchestra was regaining its brilliance and fame.

Koussevitzky had a three-year contract with the Symphony. It was renewed again and again, despite his numerous disagreements with the directors and the manager of the orchestra, in some which he was not always right.

Sergei Alexandrovich was a proud man, at times haughty, hot tempered, stubborn and vain, extremely sensitive to criticism even when expressed in a most deferential manner. For seemingly trivial reasons he could and did break with old colleagues. He could fly into a rage at moments when another man in his place would have just smiled.

I vividly recollect such an occasion. After one of his best concerts with the Boston Symphony at Carnegie Hall my wife and I went backstage. The room was full of admirers singing his praise. Koussevitzky was happy and in high spirits. He told me: "Tonight I gave them my very best, and they liked it." While we were talking a young man approached us. He reverently shook hands with the conductor, complimented him on his

great mastery, and innocently remarked: "What a pity, Dr. Koussevitzky, that you never play Scriabin." Instantly the conductor's face turned red. His eyes flashed as he shouted: "Who are you to tell me what and whom to play!" There was a hush in the room. Taken aback the young man tried to apologize. But that was of no use. Finally he fled under a torrent of unintelligible shouts. Koussevitzky's knowledge of the English language was always limited, and when he became excited nobody could understand him.

Koussevitzky was a great conductor. He restored an orchestra that once had been great, no mean achievement. But far greater was his contribution toward the development of music in America. In Russia Koussevitzky popularized Russian and European modern composers: Scriabin, Stravinsky, Debussy, Strauss. In this country he very soon began to encourage American composers: Aaron Copland, Roy Harrison, Roger Sessions, Leonard Bernstein, Howard Hanson, William Schuman, and many others. And again, this was not achieved without a struggle. He had to overcome inertia and prejudice.

"Copland," Koussevitzky told me, "wrote a brilliant composition, *Music for the Theater*. Now it is being performed all over America. But how difficult it was to win recognition. In Boston the public heard it with its usual politeness. In New York critics took it apart completely. But the worst happened in Brooklyn. The directors of the Music Academy requested me not to perform such music." "Our public," they said, "does not care for it." "I remarked to them: Copland was born in Brooklyn, and I believed that you would like to hear his music." But they insisted: "We don't want it."

Sergei Alexandrovich laughed: "I avenged myself upon the Brooklynites. Copland became popular. I played his compositions everywhere but never in Brooklyn. Seven years later the directors begged me to include in the program compositions by 'our Copland'."

To lead an orchestra is a great responsibility in itself. It requires much time and energy. Many conductors find this enough to occupy all their time, but Koussevitzky did not. In Russia he wanted to create a great musical center, a school for

composers, conductors, and instrumentalists. Why not in America?

His first efforts in 1929 failed because of the depression which followed. But he was not one to give up. An opportunity presented itself to him when the late Henry Hadley organized the Berkshire Symphonic Festival in the summer of 1934. A year later Koussevitzky and the Boston Symphony were invited to give a Festival program in 1936. Sergei Alexandrovich sized up the situation. The Berkshires at Stockbridge were the place for his plans. "It will not surprise me," he remarked, "if the old habit changes and many Europeans come here instead."

The beginning was modest. Three concerts given the first year, six the next year, and nine the year after. Public interest in the Musical Festivals grew. Music lovers from all over the country, even from Canada and Mexico, began to come there. However it was not yet a music center. Koussevitzky never ceased talking and writing about one. "The United States," he maintained, "can and must establish a center. American freedom favors it. American financial resources make it possible. Fast growth of American culture makes such center a necessity."

He would dream aloud: "We shall create an Academy of Music and Fine Arts; great composers will teach composition; great virtuosi, the art of good playing; great conductors, the secrets of conducting orchestras and choruses. Distinguished thinkers and scientists will lecture at this Academy." Gradually those dreams became a reality. They captivated others, musicians, critics, even the staid directors of the Boston Symphony.

One day an American woman, Mrs. Gorham Brooks, visited Koussevitzky and offered him her estate, Tanglewood, in the Berkshires as a place for his Academy. He did not know the lady, and he had never heard of Tanglewood. He thanked Mrs. Brooks and promised to consider her offer. Later that day he asked the manager of the Symphony what he thought of Tanglewood as a place for Musical Festivals.

"Tanglewood!" cried the surprised manager, "one of the most beautiful places in the Berkshire Hills! But it is ridiculous to believe it can be had."

"Why not?"

"It is an historic estate about which much has been written in American literature. Emerson visited there, Hawthorne wrote his *Tanglewood Tales* nearby. The owner, Mrs. Brooks, is very wealthy and she will never agree to sell."

"We shall have it free," said Koussevitzky.

"Are you out of your mind?" shouted the manager.

Sergei Alexandrovich laughed. "Not at all. Mrs. Brooks was here today and offered me her estate as a gift."

Thus on American soil the dreams of a Russian conductor found their realization. When his wife passed away, he established in her memory the Koussevitzky Foundation to help talented youth. In Tanglewood he created a music and fine arts center. He helped the development of musical taste in this country more than any other conductor with the possible exception of Walter Damrosch. And he did more than any one else for American composers. He encouraged them by performing their compositions. He urged them to write and commissioned their works. He would arrange the presentation of new compositions before they were written. Once he promised to present William Schuman's *American Festival* long before it was put on paper. The work was favorably received, and was followed by the composer's *Third Symphony*.

America gave Sergei Alexandrovich everything: a full and free life, honors (he received honorary doctorates from six universities), and fame. And he, in return, gave himself to America. He gave her his talent, his tremendous energy, his love of art, and his loyalty.

In 1941 Koussevitzky became an American citizen. He explained this step to me in the following words: "I waited for many years. I was not in a hurry to abandon my old country for a new one. Only a deep conviction that America is indeed the one country today where people can freely devote themselves to furthering the things they believe in, only the knowledge that here I can finally achieve what I wished to do in Russia, made me take this step."

For Koussevitzky music was everything, his guiding star, his very life, his faith. He believed that "music can save humanity." And he was true to himself when, on his seventieth

birthday in 1944, he insisted that an International Music Festival should take place concurrently with the postwar Peace Conference.

"If we send," he said, "to the Peace Conference our great singers and musicians together with one of our great orchestras, if other countries do the same, we shall have then an international musical gathering of tremendous importance. It will give the participants of the conference rest, peace of mind, and a deep spiritual satisfaction. It will inspire them and lighten their burden."

Koussevitzky probably believed in the words of the Bard of Avon:

The man that hath no music in himself
Nor is not moved with concord of sweet sounds,
Is fit for treason, stratagems and spoils;
Let no such man be trusted.

Report on the Oxford Conference on Recent Changes in Soviet Society

BETWEEN June 24 and 29, 1957, St. Antony's College of Oxford held, in joint sponsorship with the Congress for Cultural Freedom, an international conference on "Recent Changes in the Soviet Society." The purpose of the conference, which was attended by thirty active participants and a somewhat larger number of observers, was to analyze the principal political and intellectual developments which had taken place in the Soviet Union and its possessions since the death of Stalin and to discuss the long-range prospects of the Soviet system. The following papers were prepared for the occasion: "Changes in the Social and Political Realm" (Merle Fainsod and Bertram D. Wolfe); "Tensions in the Cultural Realm" (Max Hayward); "The New Social Forces" (Raymond Aron); "Russia and the Satellites" (Richard Pipes); "The USSR and the West" (G. Hudson); "The Eastern Horizons" (A.D. Gorwala); "The Prediction of Soviet Behavior" (Daniel Bell); and "The Pattern of Revolution: 1917-1957" (G.H. Seton-Watson).

While the participants disagreed on many issues, and almost every paper touched off a certain amount of debate, two issues seemed to acquire a position of particular importance: 1) the possibility of a long-range evolution of the Soviet Union into a "normal," stable society, and, 2) the character and aspirations of the young Soviet intelligentsia of today.

On the first of these two issues the opposite points of view were represented by Mr. Wolfe and Mr. Aron, with Mr. Fainsod taking a half-way position. Mr. Wolfe maintained that the Soviet state represents a modern version of ancient despotisms, and like its prototypes, has a great capacity for absorbing changes which do not affect its essential character. Mr. Aron, on the other hand, approaching the problem from an economical and social rather than political point of view, argued that industrial-

ization has its own inner logic which compels a society to evolve in a rational, legally normalized direction regardless of the intent of its political leadership. Ultimately, this debate boils itself down to the problem of the relative primacy of politics over economics, with the "totalitarian" school championing the former, and the sociological school the latter.

The discussion of the Soviet intelligentsia centered on the question of the political consciousness of contemporary Soviet youth. Mr. Isaiah Berlin, in his comment on Mr. Hayward's paper, expressed the opinion that the new Soviet intelligentsia is not politically-minded, and that its displeasure with the regime is a displeasure with very concrete shortcomings rather than with the system as a whole. This opinion aroused a certain amount of opposition on the part of those participants who felt that under conditions presently prevailing in the Soviet Union dissatisfaction with concrete features of Soviet life is the only form which political consciousness can at all assume. It was also noted that there prevails among Soviet youth a general scepticism of slogans and high-sounding principles, with the result that its political interest tends in the direction of "small deeds." Perhaps the two viewpoints can be reconciled through a more precise definition of the term "political consciousness," for this term entails the concern with concrete programs as well as with public affairs in general.

The general tenor of the conference was one of scepticism and pessimism, the prevailing opinion being that there had been no fundamental changes in the Soviet Union since 1953, and that there was no immediate prospect for changes as a result of pressures from below. The disagreement, insofar as it existed, concerned rather the long-range prospects, with one group holding the "system" is so firmly entrenched and so viable that all changes are perforce "within-the-system" changes and that the regime can therefore last indefinitely, and another group arguing that certain socio-economic and intellectual forces which exist already in Soviet society and which the government must willy-nilly promote further, will in time inevitably alter the character of the Soviet state.

RICHARD PIPES

Book Reviews

MEISSNER, BORIS, AND RESHETAR, JOHN S., Jr. *The Communist Party of the Soviet Union. Party Leadership, Organization and Ideology*. Foreign Policy Research Institute Series: Number 4. New York, Praeger, 1956. 276 pp. \$5.00.

Although the Statutes of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union called for the holding of a Party Congress every three years, for thirteen years after the Eighteenth Congress of 1939 no Congress met. Then, beginning with the Nineteenth Congress in October, 1952, highly important events shook the Communist Party. Stalin's death occurred in March, 1953, followed by the execution of Beria and the fall of Malenkov, and then finally by the Twentieth Congress in February, 1956, at which Khrushchev rose to new heights. The book under review deals with this period.

The first two chapters were written by Professor Boris Meissner, who deals with the Nineteenth Congress and the changes made shortly after Stalin's death. In the work of the Congress he notes several developments, such as the changing of the name of the Party from "All-Union Communist Party (of Bolsheviks)" to "Communist Party of the Soviet Union," with "of Bolsheviks" omitted. He believes that this indicates a closer tie between Party and state and that it emphasizes that the Soviet Party is the leader of all the other Communist Parties, including that

of China. Another fact noted is that 66.5 per cent of the members of this Congress had received higher education, while 18.7 per cent had had secondary education. These intelligentsia were largely officials of the Soviet regime. Even more important was the new structure of the central organs of the Party. The Central Committee, while hailed as the vital institution, had its membership almost doubled and its plenary sessions reduced from four to two per year—which would make it unwieldy and ineffectual. Similarly, the Presidium of the Central Committee, with twenty-five members and eleven candidate members, was also less effective than the smaller Politburo which it replaced. The powers of the Secretariat were increased with the result that more than ever the Secretary would dominate the Party and the nation. The already scanty powers of the local Party organizations were still further reduced.

After Stalin's death, however, the power of the Secretariat was somewhat reduced. The Presidium was made more effective by reducing its size to ten members and four candidates, and the real power was shared by Malenkov, as Premier, Khrushchev, the Party Secretary, and Beria, backed by the political police. Beria's execution in June, 1953 left Malenkov and Khrushchev to share control. The great emphasis on the restoration of "collective leadership," so Dr. Meissner holds, really has meant little, as the organization of power and the ideol-

ogy of the regime has been little altered since Stalin's time. To be sure, there was greater flexibility and greater initiative in trying to solve the country's problems, but the same problems remained nonetheless.

Even before the Twentieth Congress of the Communist Party in 1956, Malenkov had fallen and Khrushchev, seconded by Bulganin, had risen to full power. Professor Reshetar, author of the third chapter, feels that, in spite of the attacks on Stalin, much is as before. The stress on heavy industry instead of light, the slightly moderated attitude toward capitalism, and the grudging admission that there might be non-violent ways of reaching socialism, showed little departure from the earlier regime. To be sure, some new notes have been sounded: concessions have been promised to workers, consumers, and peasants. But the author thinks that this means little. Similarly, although Khrushchev does not receive adulation like that paid to the fallen Leader, he has played the predominant role, not only in economic affairs, but also in the outstanding diplomatic events of the last years. Thus Professor Reshetar believes that Khrushchev's regime differs from that of Stalin only in non-essentials.

In addition to the three chapters of text discussed above the book contains much additional material, including charts indicating the structure of the Communist Party, and eight pages comparing the texts of the Party Statutes of 1939 and 1952. The third section of the book contains forty-four pages listing all the members of the significant central and local committees of the Communist Party. Finally,

appendices present the text of the Party Statutes, Stalin's essay on "The Economic Problems of Socialism in the U.S.S.R.," and articles dealing with the technique of collective leadership. For the specialist in the details of the Communist Party this volume is a gold mine of information. The general reader, however, will find it difficult to pick out the main points from the mass of minor details.

JOHN SHELTON CURTISS
Duke University

HAZARD, JOHN N. *The Soviet System of Government*. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1957, 249 pp. \$4.00.

In the words of the editor of the Chicago Library of Comparative Politics, there is a need for the "contextual" approach to politics which emphasizes such elements as ideology, social structure, pressure groups and the like. Professor Hazard's study is designed to meet that need, and consequently his book is not an analysis of the mechanics and operations of the Soviet regime but rather a brief survey of Soviet society as a going concern. In it he sketches the development of ideology, discusses broadly the role of the Party and its subsidiary organizations, comments on Soviet administration, describes Soviet intervention in the private affairs of the citizen and the patterns of employment, as well as dealing with such matters as the army and the legal system.

Professor Hazard's conceptual scheme involves emphasis on the relationship between "democratic forms" and "totalitarian counterweights." He feels that such an

approach is preferable to an analysis of the Soviet system which stresses its distinctively totalitarian character because it makes the student more aware of the dangers potentially inherent even in a democratic system. While such emphasis on democratic vigilance is certainly praiseworthy, this reviewer must register his doubt as to whether such an approach really lends itself to the most significant political insights into the essence of Soviet government. It appears to this reviewer that Professor Hazard's method does not bring out in sharp focus so crucial a matter as the impact of ideologically motivated, intensively promoted social change on already centralized and bureaucratized political institutions which offer no restraint to abuse through organized violence. As a result neither the role of the top echelons of the party in central policy formulation and in guiding the transformation of Soviet society nor the organization of Party controls on such levels as agricultural collectives (particularly in terms of the important organizational changes since 1953) nor in the mobilization of labor and its control on the factory level is sufficiently developed and documented.

This reviewer is further compelled to question the decision of the Chicago editorial committee to publish its texts without footnotes. Such a decision is eminently unfair to the authors who are forced to make statements which they cannot elaborate due to space limitations but which could have been documented in footnotes. Furthermore the mere process of documentation helps to prevent minor factual errors which inevitably creep in. A few examples of questionable points

which could stand elaboration may suffice: Professor Hazard's suggestion that the Vlasov affair was a case of party members who fought Stalin "to establish the right of party members to share in party decisions" (p. 38); the statement that "with the passage of time, the local nationalism of the minorities seems to have been reduced" (p. 82) would be more meaningful if some reference was made to the purges of the nationality intelligentsia; "Public opinion was always a matter of grave concern to Lenin" (p. 90) and the statement that the trial of Tukhachevsky and his colleagues was denounced as a falsification after the death of Stalin (p. 142) both seem questionable without documentation. Some minor errors involve such matters as the date of Yagoda's arrest and his occupation at the time (p. 64) or the translation of the O.O. as the General Section (p. 146). Such trivial points would probably have been corrected if the footnote device had not been altogether abolished. These objections notwithstanding, Professor Hazard's contribution to the study of comparative politics provides students with a springboard for further analysis, critique, and discussion.

ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI

Harvard University

DMYTRYSHYN, BASIL. *Moscow and the Ukraine, 1918-1953: A Study of Russian Bolshevik Nationality Policy*. New York, Bookman Associates, 1956. 310 pp. \$5.00.

While there have been several treatments of the relationship between the Soviet regime and the most important of its non-Russian

Union Republics, this study provides the first detailed analysis of many aspects of the problem. It provides an interesting, though far from exhaustive, survey of controversies between Ukrainians and Russians in the 'twenties. The most important contribution of this study is the assembling of a large body of scattered statistical material on the sociological, political, and economic life of the Ukraine, with special attention to the relation of those factors to nationality. The chapter on economic relations, dealing primarily with manufacturing and raw materials, is particularly useful. Dr. Dmytryshyn is also thoroughly aware of the importance of Ukrainian agriculture; but he adds comparatively little on this subject, which indeed requires a separate monograph. One might wish, however, that he had documented his discussion of the catastrophic losses in population resulting from the 1933 famine by an analysis of the revealing statistics on age groups in the Ukrainian schools contained in the 1941 State Plan, which he uses in other contexts.

The treatment of the pre-purge period (up to 1933) is soundest and most detailed; as Dr. Dmytryshyn points out, sources on nationality relations for the later period are far fewer and less reliable. The discussion of the later years contains a number of errors (e.g., the statement on p. 167 that Germany expressed its disinterest in Bukovina in August, 1939). The author also fails to round out his important statistical analyses (for example, of the language distribution of the Ukrainian press) by presentation of available statistics for recent years. The treatment of con-

temporary events necessarily involves some speculation; however, this reviewer suspects that some of Dr. Dmytryshyn's hypotheses—for example, that Leonid Melnikov's dismissal, like the cession of the Crimea to the Ukraine, was part of a calculated policy of the Soviet leadership to placate the Ukrainians—may prove to be better founded than more widely publicized guesses.

JOHN A. ARMSTRONG

University of Wisconsin

MILLER, MIKHAIL. *Archaeology in the U.S.S.R. Research Program on the U.S.S.R.* New York, Praeger, 1956. 256 pp. \$5.00.

This book is a translation from Russian of Professor M. A. Miller's work published in Munich in 1954 by the Institute for the Study of the U.S.S.R. The author, born in 1883 in the Don region, from his youth participated in excavations organized in southern Russia, and for many years taught at the Rostov-on-Don University.

The work is divided into five parts. The first deals with "the Development of Archaeology in Russia before the Revolution," from the first excavations of the rich remains by "treasure hunters." Purposeful, scientific excavations were inaugurated by Peter the Great in 1718, if one discounts the accidental finding of the mammoth's bones in 1679. Professor Miller describes the rapid development of archaeology in Russia in the second half of the eighteenth and especially in the nineteenth centuries, listing the main archaeological institutions, the principal publications, and the lead-

ing pre-revolutionary Russian archaeologists.

Part II is devoted to "The Period of the New Economic Policy" which the author describes as a period when archaeological studies flourished in an atmosphere of complete freedom, especially in the regional studies movement. The pre-revolutionary Russian archaeologists, organized in the Russian Academy for the History of Material Culture, were allowed to train cadres of able and competent archaeologists, even better qualified than the older generation, according to the author. N. Marr, who directed the Institute until his death in 1934, did not try to emulate M. Pokrovsky, who during the same period submitted his fellow-historians to a hardly tolerable sectarian domination. This favorable situation began to deteriorate with the advent of the First Five Year Plan.

Part III describes the impact of the "socialist offensive" as "The Revolution in Archaeology (1930-1934)." It led to the liquidation of regional studies, to the submission of all archaeological studies to the Marxian straightjacket, and to the arrests and exile of the majority of the older generation of archaeologists, while the centralized archaeological institutions were placed under the direction of avowed Marxists. It meant the ruin of the achievements of the preceding period, and the end of archaeology as an independent scholarly discipline.

However, as Professor Miller puts it, "the dialectical process of development" did not allow things to remain at this low level. Adjusting itself to the new international situation, the Communist government was preparing what Professor N.

Timasheff defined as "The Great Retreat," a rehabilitation of some pre-revolutionary values, among them that of Russian patriotism. Archaeology, as an element of Russia's past, was also rehabilitated. In 1935 arrests and exile of archaeologists were discontinued, and "during the entire period between 1935 and 1941 there was not a single arrest among the archaeologists" (p. 108). This is all the more remarkable since the great purges took place during this period. Obviously, the available archaeological personnel, which had its great purge earlier, was so depleted that no further depletion was possible. Anyway, the remaining archaeologists were allowed to rebuild the shattered discipline, and "at the beginning of World War II archaeology in the U.S.S.R. had almost attained the European . . . level" (p. 131).

New vicissitudes, however, were in store for Soviet archaeology: World War II, which Professor Miller left out of his story, and the postwar trials to which Part V is devoted ("The Development of Archaeology in the U.S.S.R. after World War II"). Archaeological research and publications had to align themselves with what the Communist government considered as exigencies of the "cold war." This time research became colored mainly by extreme nationalism. From 1950 on, the situation was further aggravated by Stalin's sudden condemnation of "Marrism." The official repudiation of this doctrine led to a new purge, although not as radical as that of 1930-1934, and to a further centralization of Soviet archaeology under Communist direction. Quantitatively Soviet archaeological research and publi-

cation remain impressive, but it is a politically directed discipline, and Professor Miller ends his book with a recommendation of extreme caution in regard to its conclusions.

Archaeology in the U.S.S.R. is an informative and thorough account of the fortunes (and misfortunes) of a scholarly discipline in an ideocratic regime. One must be grateful to Professor Miller for his inquiry, which throws a vivid and ominous light not only on the changing status of archaeology in the U.S.S.R., but on the general conditions of scholarly research under Communist dictatorship.

MARC SZEFTTEL

Cornell University

CHARQUES, R. D. *A Short History of Russia*. New York, Dutton, 1956. 284 pp. \$3.95.

This is a colorful and at the same time thoughtful survey of Russia from early times to the present. If, as its author unassumingly states, it is "a work of vulgarization," it certainly sets a high standard for the *vulgus*.

Richard Denis Charques is an English-born journalist and literary critic who has devoted part of his career to studying Russia, the land of his parents. He wrote two short books on Soviet education and politics in the 1930's, and has done some translations, including Fadeev's *The Nineteen*.

For his present excursion into history he has perused the standard authorities in English and Russian and, frankly taking guidance from their evaluations, has produced a summary that is far briefer, much less detailed, and more purely narrative than the texts now in general use. He concentrates on weaving

the multiple strands of Russian into one chronological pattern in which the whole, the parts, and the relationships between the parts are all clear. As he moves along, he calls attention to similarities (and, unfortunately less persistently, to contrasts) between the Soviet period and the earlier periods. In general, he demonstrates admirable skill and judgment.

Mr. Charques has sacrificed much for the sake of brevity. Especially regrettable is his conscious neglect of the non-Russian peoples and the non-European areas of Russian expansion. But perhaps one must expect such omissions in a volume of only about ninety-five thousand words.

There are, however, other kinds of deficiencies. Typographical errors may be overlooked, although some of them will be confusing to the general reader (for example, on p. 54, Zoe's marriage was in 1472; on p. 89, Michael's election was in 1613). Factual errors are more troublesome. The patent of the Grand Principality of Vladimir did not pass directly from Iurii to Ivan I, but went for several years into non-Muscovite hands (p. 40). Owners of hereditary estates could still transfer them in the time of Ivan III (p. 58). Avvakum died long after, rather than before Nikon's fall from power (p. 101). In Peter's Table of Ranks, military personnel obtained hereditary nobility by appointment to the fourteenth grade, rather than the eighth (p. 115). There are several other similar slips, including some in the maps (especially the map on pp. 240-241).

There are also obscurities of a broader sort. For example, it is not enough to describe Pushkin's lan-

guage as "unfettered by Old Slavonic" (p. 162) without indicating that by his time "Old Slavonic" elements had been incorporated into the living tongue and in fact were responsible for much of its richness. It would have been well to explain that when Stolypin spoke of the "sober and the strong" (p. 229) he meant the majority of the Russian peasants, not just the minority who were later to emerge as Kulaks. It is misleading to summarize the Trotsky-Stalin conflict as Mr. Charques has done (pp. 259-261) without clarifying Trotsky's position and Stalin's subsequent switch.

The author's literary gift sometimes leads him into loose generalization and hyperbole. Can he, for example, justly maintain that "Tenacity of will . . . is no part of the Russian character" (p. 88)? And does he need to insist that Alexander II in the years 1855-1861 was actually "the most conservative until then, of Russian emperors" (p. 185)?

While those and other shortcomings would be readily dismissed if found in a lesser work, they are keenly disappointing amidst the solid achievements of Mr. Charques' valuable synthesis. For this book sets forth innumerable ways of linking and relating the materials of Russian history so as to arouse curiosity, capture interest, and heighten comprehension. Despite its weaknesses, it is in many respects a triumph of the popularizer's art.

RALPH T. FISHER, JR.

Yale University

LUNDIN, C. LEONARD. *Finland in the Second World War*. Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 1957. 303 pp. \$5.00.

MAZOUR, ANATOLE G.. *Finland Between East and West*. Princeton, New Jersey, Van Nostrand Company, 1956. 298 pp. \$6.50.

TANNER, VAINO. *The Winter War: Against Russia, 1939-1940*. Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1957. 274 pp. \$5.00.

Since the decline of Sweden as a great power, the position of Finland in world politics has depended largely on Russian policy. So long as Russian expansionism in northern Europe was a vital force, Finland's status as the "last province" of the Swedish kingdom was insecure. After becoming a Grand Duchy, Finland was able to maintain its remarkable autonomy only at the will of its Grand Duke. Even independence did not reduce the significance of Russian attitudes towards the Finns, as the events of 1939-1944 demonstrated. These three books represent a welcome addition to the English-language literature dealing with Finland vis-à-vis Russia.

Mazour's work is by far the most ambitious. It is a substantial attempt to trace the fitful course of Finnish political history. His analysis of pre-1917 events is superb. The canons of scholarly objectivity are observed rather closely, and he has used the first-rate Russian-language archives in the University of Helsinki as the basis for his account of the Grand Duchy period. In dealing with the first two decades of Finnish independence, however, there is a noticeable decline in accuracy, due, no doubt, to paucity of non-

Finnish sources. Secondary accounts of doubtful reliability have been utilized to a rather considerable degree, especially in the account of the Lapua movement. Mazour's account of post-1939 events is essentially correct, and draws upon some (although by no means all) of the rich "war literature." Mazour's theme in characterizing postwar relations between the two nations is coexistence. This stress should do much to counteract the widespread assumption in the United States that, since 1944, Finland has been a Soviet satellite. It is perhaps doubtful, however, whether either the Russians or the Finns feel that since war's end "the Finnish nation has reached a safe harbor" (page 206). It may well be that the Finns are walking Blondin's tightrope. Twelve extremely valuable appendices are included in Mazour's volume.

Lundin's study is much more limited in scope. It analyzes the three wars in which Finland participated 1939-1944: the Winter War, cooperation with Germany against Russia during 1941-1944, and the campaign to drive the Germans out of Finnish Lapland during 1944-1945. It is the second of these wars with which Lundin is primarily concerned. His approach is to contrast the extensive memoirs of Finnish politicians (including Tanner) and military leaders with those of their German counterparts in an attempt to arrive at an understanding of the nature of the Finnish-German *Waffenbrüderschaft*. The result is an intensely interesting essay in historiography, as well as substantial insight into this strange relationship. At the time of Operation *Barbarossa* Finland and Germany were not linked by a formal alli-

ance. With the prospect of rapid victory, however, the Finns began to conceive not only of regaining that territory ceded in the peace treaty signed in March, 1940, but also of winning by conquest Eastern Karelia, long coveted by right-wing Finnish activities. During 1941-1942 the prospects for such conquest appeared bright, and German-Finnish cooperation could be relatively extensive. When it became apparent, however, that the German invasion of Russia would probably end in catastrophe, and that Finnish war aims would not be realized, this collaboration became increasingly tenuous, finally collapsing with a separate peace between Finland and Russia, and resulting warfare between Finns and Germans in Lapland.

In the deep reality of prolonged and unsuccessful war, many Finns came to question the wisdom of the previous rigid attitude towards the Russians, especially during the crucial Moscow negotiations in October-November 1939. Väinö Tanner, one of the Finnish delegates at these talks, who also served as Foreign Minister during the Winter War, was not one of these Finns. His memoirs, recently translated into English, are an apology for this "hard" Finnish policy. Since, as leader of the Social Democratic party—Finland's largest—he was primarily responsible for the decisions actually made, this is perhaps not surprising. It is doubtful whether his memoirs convey "a correct understanding of the political activity of the Winter War period" (page vii), as their author hopes. They contain, however, a wealth of detail, unembroidered by emotionalism. In spite of their *ex parte* nature, they will probably re-

main the most important single source for the diplomatic history of the Winter War.

MARVIN RINTALA
*Fletcher School of Law
and Diplomacy*

SANINE, KYRA. *Saltykov-Chthéd-rine: sa vie et ses oeuvres*. Paris, Institut d'Etudes Slaves, 1955. 350 pp.

Because Saltykov's personal life was "hardly absorbing," he devoted himself, says Kyra Sanine, to the interests of others; and therefore "to study him is to study Russia." This she has demonstrated in her full, sensible book, which is social and intellectual history as much as literary biography. She has shown admirably how important trends of Russian thought in the intellectually turbulent period of Turgenev, Dostoevsky, and Tolstoy were concentrated in the history of Saltykov's development. Brought up, like Turgenev, in circumstances that from early childhood impressed on him the inhumanity of serfdom; influenced, like Turgenev and Dostoevsky by Belinsky; exiled to the provinces for advocating "dangerous views"; a friend of Petrashevsky; allied with Nekrasov in the publication of a journal; impressed, to some degree by Slavophile doctrines, Saltykov had an important role in the mental life of his day. He took account of all current theories and creeds, but remained independent and original as thinker and writer.

Miss Sanine is especially interesting as she describes the quality of his mind and traces the evolution of his views: his dislike of metaphysics, his choice, among dominating

philosophies, of those of Fourier and Saint-Simon rather than Hegel's; his antipathy to Russian "messianism" and to the Tolstoyan principle of non-resistance; his view of reality as a succession of simple events and of Utopia, not as a dream capable of realization, but an unattainable ideal, essential in impelling man to that perpetual striving which alone makes life valuable. He satirized "*Thomme moyen*," caricatured all classes of society, and attacked not absolute evil, but the evil of insipid daily commonplace, scourging vicious men rather than abstract vices. Society, he thought, did not make, but permitted man to be evil. His aim was to show how far human vices could lead men when no social check restrained them, and in "Aesopic" parables about his contemporaries, he condemned his world in the name of an ideal society. Unlike his great fellow writers, he was not "above" actuality, and that is why his work requires commentary and why followers of various dogmas claim him as their ideological ancestor. "Twenty years from now," he had written in 1882, "either I will be forgotten, or I will be read with commentaries." He has not been forgotten. A twenty volume edition of his works was published in Russia between 1933 and 1941, and within the last six years three major biographies and numerous other studies of him have appeared there. Miss Sanine has made good use of them. Her work is the fullest study of Saltykov to have come out in the West, and as such, it is a kind of encyclopedia of his times, a very valuable contribution indeed to the study of Russian thought, which confirms Gorky's opinion that it is

"impossible to understand Russia in the second half of the nineteenth century without the help of Shchedrine."

HELEN MUCHNIC

Smith College

DUDINTSEV, VLADIMIR. *Not by Bread Alone*. Transl. by Dr. Edith Bone. New York. Dutton, 1957. 448 pp. \$3.95.

Not by Bread Alone is a novel by Soviet author V. Dudintsev, which first appeared in the literary magazine *Novy Mir*, in 1956, and which has already been published abroad by "Svoboda" in Munich, Germany and by E. P. Dutton & Co. of New York. The novel stirred much discussion in literary and political circles in the Soviet Union as well as in the Western world and became as well-known as Ilia Ehrenburg's *The Thaw* which appeared in 1953.

Briefly, its story concerns a dedicated inventor whose whole interest in life is his idea for a new machine which produces better and cheaper pipes of several varieties and who is trying to put his project through the thick wall of resisting Soviet bureaucrats and their servants—the intelligent technicians who are accustomed to considering their own interests and privileges first. The project may be very ingenious but it is created by an outsider and should be denied for this very reason.

This persistent struggle goes on for eight years. The poor inventor is jobless and starving but continues to persist nevertheless; the bureaucrats employ every weapon to combat him, including denunciation which results in confinement in a

concentration camp. But the young idealist gets help from friends, mostly from "simple people." Some are women who love him; some are unsuccessful older inventors, and last but not least a true Communist, a high functionary of the Party, comes to his aid and leads everything to a happy end: the inventor is released from the concentration camp, his machine is built, his enemies are forced to acknowledge its merits, and his victory is complete.

The novel is written in the usual bombastic style of "socialist realism" with emphasis on the heroism and achievements of the Soviet people. On the whole it represents the slogans of Soviet propaganda, such as: "All strength for the harvest" or, "Repair of tractors is your highest duty!" and so on, as if harvesting, repair work and all labor in general are a unique phenomenon which requires special appeals and not mere simple toil, as in the rest of the world.

But the essential point in this novel is merely the picture of Soviet bureaucracy which is shown as merciless, ugly, sycophant and largely ignorant. Although the author apparently did not wish to be satirical, his types sometimes seem brilliantly satirical, as though created by the best anti-Communist propaganda.

Some similar works of Soviet authors somehow slipped through censorship in recent years, such as the play, "Without Mentioning the Names" by Minko, 1953, for example, but at least their satirical intent was hidden under the cover of "comedy." *Not by Bread Alone* is anything but comedy. It is serious and bold criticism, probably corresponding in some ways with the

revelations of Khrushchev at the Twentieth Party Congress. Whether the "genuine, ideal Communism" which Dudintsev proclaims to the end represents his real opinion, or is merely the inevitable bow before the almighty Party, does not matter.

What matters is that Dudintsev's novel is a significant document of contemporary Soviet life and system.

IRINA SABUROVA

Munich, Germany

Letter to the Editor

Dear Sir:

The review of my book, *Knowledge and Revolution; The Russian Colony in Zurich (1870-1873)*, in the April issue of *The Russian Review* contains a number of inaccuracies which should not go uncorrected.

First, I do not see, how, in writing the history of the Zurich colony, I could have avoided describing "petty jealousies, intrigues, mutual invectives and even physical fights." If I had omitted this I should not have fulfilled my task. Nor can I see how this can be damaging to my thesis (which one?).

As stated in the Foreword, the book was written in English, not translated. From what your reviewer writes, some readers might infer that the persons I mentioned read the proofs. I should like to point out that they only saw the MS and that the responsibility for the language is entirely my own. I gratefully accept the corrections concerning language, with two exceptions: the use of "pope" is justified by my Concise Oxford Dictionary, and I did mean to say that Markovich was anti-liberal.

The concept of *raznochintsy* has its own history, as can be seen when comparing *The Encyclopedia of Brockhaus and Efron* with the *Great Soviet Encyclopedia*, and Dal with Ushakov. Even the Brockhaus Encyclopedia contains the statement that the *raznochintsy* were often contrasted with the nobility. From these sources it appears that the rendering of *raznochintsy* as people of non-noble descent is adequate and not contrary to use.

It seems presumptuous to suppose that somebody writing on Russian history does not know the meaning of *krestiyane*. Speaking of "christened property" I had in mind, of course, Herzen's well-known essay of that title, written in 1853. I did not give this reference since for the general reader the term should be clear in itself, while specialists may be supposed to know the source. "The land is ours, but we are the tsar's" is no misquotation.

Bakunin used it as a standing expression in 1866, in a long and well-known letter on the *mir* to Herzen and Ogarev.

The Great Soviet Encyclopedia, in the article on Karakozov, gives the unqualified statement that Karakozov was tortured. Contemporary information can be found in *Belyi terror ili vystrel 4 aprelya 1865 goda*, referred to by me, appeared in 1875, but was written in 1866. On pp. 9-10 the author characterizes the treatment to which Karakozov was subjected as torture (*pytka*), adding an ironical note in which he quotes a third person saying: "no, they do not torture him, but they beat him every day." Thus it is not true that my statement "probably tortured several times" is not based on any historical evidence. The official report spoke of "active" and "energetic" measures, which can be interpreted in both directions. Both Shilov and Venturi make mention of contemporary rumors to the effect that Karakozov was tortured, and if both tend to the opinion that he was not, positive evidence for this is also lacking.

The title of the book referred to above disposes of the other argument, that there is no historical evidence for the statement that the period immediately after the attempt became known as "White Terror." In the literature of the period the expression can be found time and again. According to the latest and best general work on populism, after Karakozov's attempt "si apri l'epoca chiamata tradizionalmente del 'terrore bianco'" (Venturi, *Il populismo russo*. p. 567).

Lastly, from a bibliography which I never pretended to be complete, I deliberately excluded more general works on Bakunin, not only Izwolsky's, but also, Ricardo Huch's. The article by Karpovich appeared at a time when it was not available to European scholars.

Your reviewer is, of course, entitled to express any opinion on the book, but the weakness of the arguments is oddly at variance with the apodictical character of his judgement.

Amsterdam

June 22, 1957

J. M. MEIJER

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
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